China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law?

China is a high-corruption country and the ruling Communist Party (“the Party”) has made anti-corruption enforcement a top priority. China is also well known for her authoritarian decisiveness in policy making and her effectiveness in policy implementation with a centralized political control contrasting sharply with a decentralized economic policy. This chapter examines two key aspects of this formulation. First, how has the authoritarian characteristic affected China’s anticorruption enforcement; and, second, how is China different from other countries, authoritarian or otherwise, in this regard? This chapter discusses China’s anti-corruption enforcement within the context of the convergence/divergence debate and examines the degree to which the Chinese anti-corruption model converges or diverges from the prevailing “international best practice” that is commonly observed in the high income/low corruption countries. Specifically this chapter will also discuss whether China could develop an anti-corruption system that operates within a rule-based legal framework. The principal argument is that China’s anti-corruption practice manifests certain core features that may be unique to the Chinese political context and those features show most strikingly at the height of an anti-corruption campaign. But if we look beyond an exceptional “strike-hard campaign” that targets the “tigers”, shift the focus to the more routine enforcement against “flies”, and, in particular, observe China’s anti-corruption enforcement for a longer time span, it becomes clearer that China does not operate an anticorruption model sui generis. As the anti-corruption storm dies down (as it will naturally occur), the enforcement will become more routine, regularized, and institutional. When that happens, the Chinese anti-corruption model, if any, will appear no different from models elsewhere.postprin

When EU Law meets Arab Law: Assessment of Anti-Corruption Law in Morocco and Some Proposed Amendments

This article reviews the present state of the adoption of anti-corruption legal provisions usually adopted in EU (or candidate) countries in Morocco. Morocco lags behind many countries in its adoption of anti-corruption legislation and the recently established Central Agency of the Prevention of Corruption is unlikely to succeed in speeding up the adoption of these measures. English language translations of a number of Moroccan anti-corruption legal instruments are presented and amendments to these legal instruments are recommended (based on international best practice) in order to increase the likely effectiveness of Moroccan law enforcement institutions in fighting corruption.

The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

International corruption law is a growing, if understudied, area of international economic law. This Article examines two aspects of governments\u27 enforcement of the OECD\u27s Anti-Bribery Convention. The first aspect is the member state\u27s efforts to enforce its own national legislation prohibiting foreign corruption within its territory and with regards to its nationals doing business abroad. The OECD Treaty\u27s obligation concerning member states\u27 enforcement of their own national legislation is somewhat ambiguous. While the obligation to pass particular national legislation is quite clear and specific, the treaty does not specify what resources that a state must dedicate to internally enforcing these laws. As a result, states may have robust anti-corruption laws on the books but fail to enforce them in a meaningful way. This is more than an abstract concern. As of 2013, less than half of the states party to the OECD Treaty had successfully prosecuted a private actor for foreign corruption. This Article also discusses a second aspect of enforcement: how these internal enforcement ambiguities hamper state-to-state efforts to enforce the agreement. States cannot easily identify whether other states are breaching the treaty\u27s obligations when the internal enforcement obligations are opaque. This complicates international efforts to pressure other states to increase their compliance through retaliation or reciprocity. This Article concludes by discussing enforcement alternatives, namely the continued rigorous American enforcement of anti-corruption policies against private actors, even for activities having minimal territorial ties

Contracts Induced by Means of Bribery: Should they be Void or Valid?

This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption.Bribery, Contracts, Corruption, Due Diligence, Enforcement, Impugnment, Liability, Leniency, Nullity, Private Law Validity, Voidability, Voluntary Disclosure (Program)

Fighting Corruption through Regional and International Conventions: A Satisfactory Solution?

While considering the current legal frameworks adopted by the regional and international anti-corruption conventions this article aims to show (1) that the lack of a unified approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful way, (2) that regulation is unlikely to be efficient results unless there are robust enforcement mechanisms in place, and (3) that anti-corruption legislation provides only a partial answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialization. Part 2 (How Widespread is Corruption?) critically assesses the methodology adopted by Transparency International (TI) for compiling its perception index. Part 3 (Regulatory Measures: The Conventions) examines the current frameworks adopted by the existing conventions to tackle corruption. Part 4 (Enforcement and Informers) highlights the difficulties associated in enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing enforcement deficit. Part 5 (Fighting Corruption Through Re-Socialization) asks whether greater social awareness through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of society the view is put forward that part of the answer for effectively tackling corruption lies in making people aware of its long-term effects

Contracts induced by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid?

This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption. --Bribery,Contracts,Corruption,Due Diligence,Enforcement,Impugnment,Liability,Leniency,Nullity,Private Law Validity,Voidability,Voluntary Disclosure (Program)

Koordinasi dan Supervisi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam Mencegah dan Memberantas Tindak Pidana Korupsi Berdasarkan Undang-undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 Tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi

Corruption in Indonesia is widespread in society. In law enforcement, corruption, of the Corruption Eradication Commission can not do it alone, given the vast area of Indonesia. Corruption Eradication Commission should cooperate with other law enforcement agencies. Undag Act No. 30 of 2002 explained that the Corruption Eradication Commission may conduct coordination and supervision against Corruption, and act as Coordinator of the Institute. Coordination and supervision is done during this time to experience the tension between the phases of the Anti-Corruption Commission with the Indonesian National Police, for example, is the case of the SIM Simulator. The purpose of writing this thesis: first, to determine the coordination and supervision arrangements in preventing and combating corruption in Indonesia. Secondly, To know the concept of coordination and supervision ideally in preventing and combating corruption in Indonesia. From the research there are two main things that can be inferred. First, the function of coordination and supervision remains a secondary function of the Corruption Eradication Commission, in addition to the MOU of 2012 on Optimization of Anti-Corruption Coordination and Supervision weaken the authority possessed by the Corruption Eradication Commission. In practice there are sectoral ego, it arises as a result of an investigation into corruption can be done by several investigators agencies. Additionally Limitations of Human Resources is also a problem of weak coordination and supervision of the Corruption Eradication Commission. Second, to improve the coordination and supervision of one of the ways you can do is to establish the Integrated Anti-Corruption Coordination Center (SKPKT), so that the cooperation between the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Police and the Attorney General can be done with the same institutional standards

Сучасний стан розслідування корупційних злочинів в Україні

У статті досліджено сучасний стан розслідування корупційних злочинів в Україні. Проаналізовано актуальні проблеми, що виникають в процесі діяльності антикорупційних правоохоронних органів. (The article investigates the current state of the investigation of corruption crimes in Ukraine. The actual problems arising in the activity process of anti-corruption law enforcement bodies are analyzed.

Budaya Hukum dalam Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi

Corruption is seen as a serious crime because it has eliminated the economic and social rights of the people. People really hate corruption, they even condemn the criminals who have stolen state funds. On the other hand, people have the habit of giving bribes to get what they want, such as to become civil servants, speeding up the processing of documents and others. This study examines the policy of combating corruption and perceptions of corruption.Indonesia’s anti-corruption policy rests on three elements in the legal system, namely the legal substance, legal structure and legal culture. Indonesia had the rule of law and law enforcement are adequate to combat corruption, but the problem lies in the commitment in law enforcement. The legal culture of society have an important role in the prevention of corruption. Community on the one hand the fight against corruption, but on the other hand it supports corruption. Bribery done to facilitate their getting his wish