Narrative, Truth, and Trial

This Article critically evaluates the relationship between constructing narratives and achieving factual accuracy at trials. The story model of adjudication— according to which jurors process testimony by organizing it into competing narratives—has gained wide acceptance in the descriptive work of social scientists and currency in the courtroom, but it has received little close attention from legal theorists. The Article begins with a discussion of the meaning of narrative and its function at trial. It argues that the story model is incomplete, and that “legal truth” emerges from a hybrid of narrative and other means of inquiry. As a result, trials contain opportunities to promote more systematic consideration of evidence. Second, the Article asserts that, to the extent the story model is descriptively correct with respect to the structure of juror decision making, it also gives rise to normative concerns about the tension between characteristic features of narrative and the truth-seeking aspirations of trial. Viewing trials through the lens of narrative theory brings sources of bias and error into focus and suggests reasons to increase the influence of analytic processes. The Article then appraises improvements in trial mechanics—from prosecutorial discovery obligations through appellate review of evidentiary errors—that might account for the influence of stories. For example, a fuller understanding of narrative exposes the false assumption within limiting instructions that any piece of evidence exists in isolation. And to better inform how adjudicators respond to stories in the courtroom, the Article argues for modifying instructions in terms of their candor, explanatory content, and timing

The evidential weight of considered moral judgments

The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection, considered moral judgments (CMJs) are not truth-conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible, the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. The objection is solved by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. The first half of the thesis sets up the input objection, explores potential responses to the objection, and uncovers the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a justified moral theory realized

Counselors\u27 Perceptions of Training, Theoretical Orientation, Cultural and Gender Bias, and Use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-Text Revision

Counselor educators and counseling practitioners today reflect the future direction of the counseling profession; therefore, their opinions are important when discussing how professional counselors can reconcile the basic philosophies of humanistic counseling with the practical advantages and ethical and philosophical disadvantages that appear to be coexistent when discussing the diagnosis of clients and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-Text Revision (DSM). This study sought to provide a reflective and concise description of the current perceptions of licensed professional counselors in reference to their training, their practice, and their dispositions about diagnosis and utilization of the DSM despite its theoretical grounding in the medical model and its chronic problems with gender and cultural bias—all in direct opposition to counseling\u27s humanistic, multicultural model of practice. Results of this study suggested that more training in DSM/diagnosis led to participants\u27 higher perception of their ability to diagnose and utilize the DSM; however, participants\u27 perceptions were split on whether or not training should include psychopharmacology. Results also suggested that LPCs most frequently occurring ethical dilemma in relation to diagnosis involved the reimbursement requirements of insurance/managed care companies; however, they strongly disagreed that diagnosing clients conflicted with their counseling professional identity. Participants strongly agreed that they were multiculturally competent; however, those participants who indicated that they diagnose using a multicultural or wellness perspective did not agree that the DSM does not adequately present disorders in such a way as to allow LPCs to diagnose culturally diverse and female clients accurately

Counselors\u27 Perceptions of Training, Theoretical Orientation, Cultural and Gender Bias, and Use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-Text Revision

Counselor educators and counseling practitioners today reflect the future direction of the counseling profession; therefore, their opinions are important when discussing how professional counselors can reconcile the basic philosophies of humanistic counseling with the practical advantages and ethical and philosophical disadvantages that appear to be coexistent when discussing the diagnosis of clients and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-Text Revision (DSM). This study sought to provide a reflective and concise description of the current perceptions of licensed professional counselors in reference to their training, their practice, and their dispositions about diagnosis and utilization of the DSM despite its theoretical grounding in the medical model and its chronic problems with gender and cultural bias—all in direct opposition to counseling\u27s humanistic, multicultural model of practice. Results of this study suggested that more training in DSM/diagnosis led to participants\u27 higher perception of their ability to diagnose and utilize the DSM; however, participants\u27 perceptions were split on whether or not training should include psychopharmacology. Results also suggested that LPCs most frequently occurring ethical dilemma in relation to diagnosis involved the reimbursement requirements of insurance/managed care companies; however, they strongly disagreed that diagnosing clients conflicted with their counseling professional identity. Participants strongly agreed that they were multiculturally competent; however, those participants who indicated that they diagnose using a multicultural or wellness perspective did not agree that the DSM does not adequately present disorders in such a way as to allow LPCs to diagnose culturally diverse and female clients accurately

Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases

The United States Supreme Court held its 1970 decision In re Winship that in criminal prosecutions the Constitution requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Professor Lewis argues that Winship governs the validity of evidence rules in criminal cases and requires that rules of evidence do not impair the reliability of criminal convictions. The author concludes that Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which permits the admission of prejudicial evidence unless the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, violates this requirement. Rule 403 substantially increases the risk of erroneous decisionmaking and prescribes a balancing test that unconstitutionally places the major risk of decisionmaking error on the defendant. The author proposes a revision to Rule 403 that would impose on the prosecution, rather than on the defendant, the burden of showing that probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Such a revision would make Rule 403 constitutional under Winship-based reliability demands