Terrorist attacks, analyst sentiment, and earnings forecasts

We examine whether exogenous and extremely negative events, such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings, influence the sentiment and forecasts of sell-side equity analysts. We find that analysts who are local to these attacks issue forecasts that are relatively more pessimistic than the consensus forecast. This effect is stronger when the analyst is closer to the event and located in a low-crime region. Impacted analysts are also relatively more pessimistic around the one- and two-year anniversaries of the attacks. Collectively, these findings indicate that exposure to extreme negative events affects the behavior of information intermediaries and the information dissemination process in financial markets

Analyst Forecasts in New Zealand

This study explores analyst annual earnings forecasts in New Zealand. The results show that forecasts of New Zealand firms do not suffer from the pessimistic biases found in studies of forecasts for United States firms. Similar to United States studies, however, loss firm forecasts are significantly less accurate and more optimistic. These results suggest that New Zealand firms do not tend to manage earnings to beat expectations, but poorly performing firms might attempt to deceive investors by decreasing the quality of their information environment. Furthermore, optimism does appear to be impounded in stock prices, as firms with optimistic forecasts underperform firms with pessimistic forecasts by about 30%

Analyst target price accuracy and the incidence of cash flow forecasts

Research shows that analyst target price accuracy is limited and yet evidence on the factors driving this limited accuracy is inconclusive. Complementing the results of recent studies that show that the increasing incidence of cash flow forecasts in analyst reports has helped mitigate accruals mispricing, we address the question: are analyst target prices more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts than when they are not? Using propensity score matching to control for selection bias, we estimate the effect of disclosing cash flow forecasts on the target price accuracy of US stocks during 2000–2010. The results suggest that target prices are more accurate when analysts also disclose cash flow forecasts. The paper contributes to the continuing debate about the usefulness of analyst target prices as well as the usefulness of analyst cash flow forecasts

Relative Accuracy of Judgmental and Extrapolative Methods in Forecasting Annual Earnings

This paper identifies and analyses previously published studies on annual earnings forecasts. Comparisons of forecasts produced by management, analysts, and extrapolative techniques indicated that: (1) management forecasts were superior to professional analyst forecasts (the mean absolute percentage errors were 15.9 and 17.7, respectively, based on five studies using data from 1967-1974) and (2) judgmental forecasts (both management and analysts) were superior to extrapolation forecasts on 14 of 17 comparisons from 13 studies using data from 1964- 1979 (the mean absolute percentage errors were 21.0 and 28.4 for judgment and extrapolation, respectively). These conclusions, based on recent research, differ from those reported in previous reviews, which commented on less than half of the studies identified here.Annual, financial forecasts, Judgment vs. extrapolation, Management vs. analyst Amalgamated forecasts

Executive Compensation and Analyst Guidance: The Link between CEO Pay and Expectations Management

During the last decade, a surprisingly high percentage of U.S. companies has fulfilled or beaten analysts’ earnings per share forecasts. One of the most frequently cited reasons for this growing tendency is a change in the nature of U.S. executive compensation structure. As stock options have become an increasingly important part of executive compensation, the preservation or enhancement of short term stock value around the earnings announcement has become a priority for managers. Besides earnings management, a widespread way to meet analyst expectations is to inject pessimism into their forecasts by providing analysts with negative clues, or so-called downward guidance. This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between the practice of analyst guidance and executive compensation packages. We document a strong link between expectations management and the relevant options component of CEO compensation, bonus plan payments, and the value of the firm's shares owned by its managing CEO. In a second set of tests, we show that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement generate positive abnormal returns, which are significantly lower for firms suspected of managing expectations.Analyst guidance; Earnings surprise; Executive compensation; Stock options

Reported Earnings and Analyst Forecasts as Competing Sources of Information: A New Approach

We study information flows between earnings and forecasts, using suitably adapted Granger causality tests. This approach complements existing cross-sectional studies by abstracting from stock market reactions to information, and focussing on dynamic interactions between information flows instead. We find bi-directional causality in timeseries of analyst earnings forecasts and reported earnings, supporting our expectation that forecasts contribute to information that is reflected in future reports. Further, our evidence of feedback suggests that past reports and forecasts are both reflected in future forecasts, implying that the information in reports has inherent value, and that forecasts do not fully substitute for reports.

Do Investors Learn About Analyst Accuracy?

We study the impact of analyst forecasts on prices to determine whether investors learn about analyst accuracy. Our test market is the crude oil futures market. Prices rise when analysts forecast a decrease (increase) in crude supplies. In the 15 minutes following supply realizations, prices rise (fall) when forecasts have been too high (low). In both the initial price action relative to forecasts and in the subsequent reaction relative to realized forecast errors, the price response is stronger for more accurate analysts. These price reactions imply that investors learn about analyst accuracy and trade accordingly.Financial Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Political Economy,

Analyst vs. Market Forecasts of Earnings Management to Avoid Small Losses

Burgstahler and Eames (2003) present evidence that analysts commonly anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses, but often incorrectly predict its occurrence. Here we consider whether the market\u27s behavior mimics that of analysts. Our results suggest that analysts exhibit more forecast optimism in their zero earnings forecasts than in their other small earnings forecast levels, and markets exhibit less relative optimism at this point. At the 271-360 day forecast horizon, we find a reduction in the earnings response coefficient at analysts\u27 zero earnings forecasts and interpret this as reflecting less optimism in market earnings forecasts than in analyst forecasts when analysts forecast zero earnings. This evidence is consistent with the market not following analysts in erroneously predicting earnings management to avoid small losses. We do not find similar evidence for shorter forecast horizons, suggesting that market and analyst forecasts converge towards the end of the year. Finding differences in market and analyst earnings forecasts in this loss avoidance environment raises the possibility of differences in a variety of earnings management and other environments, and sends a general note of caution in using analyst forecasts issued early in the year to proxy market expectations. JEL Classification: M41, G14, G24

On the Quality of FFO Forecasts

This paper is the first attempt to provide an objective assessment of the quality of real estate funds from operations (FFO) forecasts. The work, which looks past the more primitive question concerning the appropriate measure for real estate earnings, quantifies and tests the quality of real estate investment trust (REIT) FFO forecasts relative to the net income forecasts of several comparison groups. The results show the high quality of REIT forecasts are remarkably robust and are not driven by the level of analyst attention. Investors in a post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley era may find the implications for high quality forecasts of real estate earning to be an appealing investment concept.

What Factors Drive Analyst Forecasts?

A firm's competitive environment, its strategic choices, and its internal capabilities are considered important determinants of its future performance. Yet there is little evidence on whether analysts' forecasts of firm performance actually reflect any of these factors and which are considered most important. We use survey data from 967 analysts ranking 837 companies to judge how their forecasts are related to evaluations of firms' industry competitiveness, strategic choices, and internal capabilities. Forecasts are generally associated with many of the factors that money managers rate as important in their assessments of analyst contributions, including industry growth and competitiveness, low-price strategy, strategy execution, top management quality, innovation, and performance-driven culture. We also find wide variation across variables for ratings consistency among analysts covering the same firm. On average, consistency is higher for sell-side than buy-side analysts, consistent with sell-side analysts facing greater incentives to herd