1,220 research outputs found
Renewable Electric Energy Integration: Quantifying the Value of Design of Markets for International Transmission Capacity
Integrating large quantities of supply-driven renewable electricity generation remains a political and operational challenge. One of the main obstacles in Europe to installing at least 200 GWs of power from variable renewable sources is how to deal with the insufficient network capacity and the congestion that will result from new flow patterns. We model the current methodology for controlling congestion at international borders and compare its results, under varying penetrations of wind power, with a model that simulates an integrated European network that utilises nodal/localised marginal pricing. The nodal pricing simulations illustrate that congestion - and price - patterns vary considerably between wind scenarios and within countries, and that a nodal price regime could make fuller use of existing EU network capacity, introducing substantial operational cost savings and reducing marginal power prices in the majority of European countries.Power market design, renewable power integration, congestion management, transmission economics
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Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate
Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising powermarkets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues
A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems
The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of detecting market power that have been employed by academics and market monitors/regulators. These techniques include structural and behavioural indices and analysis as well as various simulation approaches. The applications of these tools range from spot market mitigation and congestion management through to long-term market design assessment and merger decisions. Various market-power monitoring units already track market behaviour and produce indices. Our survey shows that these units collect a large amount of data from various market participants and we identify the crucial role of the transmission system operators with their access to dispatch and system information. Easily accessible and comprehensive data supports effective market power monitoring and facilitates market design evaluation. The discretion required for effective market monitoring is facilitated by institutional independence.Electricity, liberalisation, market power, regulation
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Locational-based Coupling of Electricity Markets: Benefits from Coordinating Unit Commitment and Balancing Markets
We formulate a series of stochastic models for committing and dispatching electric generators subject to transmission limits. The models are used to estimate the benefits of electricity locational marginal pricing (LMP) that arise from better coordination of day-ahead commitment decisions and real-time balancing markets in adjacent power markets when there is significant uncertainty in demand and wind forecasts. The unit commitment models optimise schedules under either the full set of network constraints or a simplified net transfer capacity (NTC) constraint, considering the range of possible real-time wind and load scenarios. The NTC-constrained model represents the present approach for limiting day-ahead electricity trade in Europe. A subsequent redispatch model then creates feasible real-time schedules. Benefits of LMP arise from decreases in expected start-up and variable generation costs resulting from consistent consideration of the full set of network constraints both day-ahead and in real-time. Meanwhile, using LMP to coordinate adjacent balancing markets provides benefits because it allows intermarket flow schedules to be adjusted in real-time in response to changing conditions. These models are applied to a stylised four-node network, examining the effects of varying system characteristics on the magnitude of the locational-based unit commitment benefits and the benefits of intermarket balancing. Although previous www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk EPRG WORKING PAPER studies have examined the benefits of LMP, these usually examine one specific system, often without a discussion of the sources of these benefits, and with simplifying assumptions about unit commitment.
We conclude that both categories of benefits are situation dependent, such that small parameter changes can lead to large changes in expected benefits. Although both can amount to a significant percentage of operating costs, we find that the benefits of balancing market coordination are generally larger than the unit commitment benefits
Merchant Transmission Investment
We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on ïżœmarket drivenïżœ transmission investment to provide the infrastructure to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model appears to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating transmission companies traditionally associated with electric transmission networks. We expand the model to incorporate imperfection in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, the effects of the behaviour system operators and transmission owners on transmission capacity and reliability, co-ordination and bargaining considerations, forward contract, commitment and asset specificity issues. This significantly undermines the attractive properties of the merchant investment model. Relying primarily on a market driven investment framework to govern investment is likely to lead to inefficient investment decisions and undermine the performance of competitive markets
Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate
Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising power markets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues.Electricity, Transmission, Regulation, Prices, Merchant Investment
A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules
This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major recommendations: 1. Switch to a multi-settlement system. 2. Introduce demand-side bidding. 3. Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export interfaces. 4. Fix the pricing of the ten minute spinning reserves.Auctions; Multiple Object Auctions; Electricity Auctions
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