Analysis and Construction of Efficient RFID Authentication Protocol with Backward Privacy

Privacy of RFID systems is receiving increasing attentions in the RFID community and an important issue required as to the security of RFID system. Backward privacy means the adversary can not trace the tag later even if he reveals the internal states of the tag sometimes before. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed RFID authentication schemes: Randomized GPS and Randomized Hashed GPS scheme. We show both of them can not provide backward privacy in Juels and Weis privacy model, which allows the adversary to know whether the reader authenticates the tag successfully or not. In addition, we present a new protocol, called Challenge-Hiding GPS, based on the Schnorr identification scheme. The challenge is hidden from the eavesdropping through the technique of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. The new protocol can satisfy backward privacy, and it has less communication overheads and almost the same computation, compared with the two schemes analyzed

Efficient and Low-Cost RFID Authentication Schemes

Security in passive resource-constrained Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags is of much interest nowadays. Resistance against illegal tracking, cloning, timing, and replay attacks are necessary for a secure RFID authentication scheme. Reader authentication is also necessary to thwart any illegal attempt to read the tags. With an objective to design a secure and low-cost RFID authentication protocol, Gene Tsudik proposed a timestamp-based protocol using symmetric keys, named YA-TRAP*. Although YA-TRAP* achieves its target security properties, it is susceptible to timing attacks, where the timestamp to be sent by the reader to the tag can be freely selected by an adversary. Moreover, in YA-TRAP*, reader authentication is not provided, and a tag can become inoperative after exceeding its pre-stored threshold timestamp value. In this paper, we propose two mutual RFID authentication protocols that aim to improve YA-TRAP* by preventing timing attack, and by providing reader authentication. Also, a tag is allowed to refresh its pre-stored threshold value in our protocols, so that it does not become inoperative after exceeding the threshold. Our protocols also achieve other security properties like forward security, resistance against cloning, replay, and tracking attacks. Moreover, the computation and communication costs are kept as low as possible for the tags. It is important to keep the communication cost as low as possible when many tags are authenticated in batch-mode. By introducing aggregate function for the reader-to-server communication, the communication cost is reduced. We also discuss different possible applications of our protocols. Our protocols thus capture more security properties and more efficiency than YA-TRAP*. Finally, we show that our protocols can be implemented using the current standard low-cost RFID infrastructures.Comment: 21 pages, Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), Vol 2, No 3, pp. 4-25, 201

KEDGEN2: A key establishment and derivation protocol for EPC Gen2 RFID systems

International audienceThe EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen2 for short) is a Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology that is gaining a prominent place in several domains. However, the Gen2 standard lacks verifiable security functionalities. Eavesdropping attacks can, for instance, affect the security of applications based on the Gen2 technology. To address this problem, RFID tags must be equipped with a robust mechanism to authenticate readers before authorising them to access their data. In this paper, we propose a key establishment and derivation protocol, which is applied at both identification phase and those remainder operations requiring security. Our solution is based on a pseudorandom number generator that uses a low computational workload, while ensuring long term secure communication to protect the secrecy of the exchanged data. Mutual authentication of the tag and the sensor and strong notions of secrecy such as forward and backward secrecy are analysed, and we prove formally that after being amended, our protocol is secure with respect to these properties

Deploying OSK on Low-Resource Mobile Devices

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI linkIt is a popular challenge to design authentication protocols that are both privacy-friendly and scalable. A large body of literature in RFID is dedicated to that goal, and many inventive mechanisms have been suggested to achieve it. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these protocols have been tested so far in practical scenarios. In this paper, we present an implementation of the OSK protocol, a scalable and privacy-friendly authentication protocol, using a variant by Avoine and Oechslin that accommodates it to time-memory trade-offs. We show that the OSK protocol is suited to certain real-life scenarios, in particular when the authentication is performed by low-resource mobile devices. The implementation, done on an NFC-compliant cellphone and a ZC7.5 contactless tag, demonstrates the practicability and efficiency of the OSK protocol and illustrates that privacy-by-design is achievable in constrained environments

Security problems of systems of extremely weak devices

In this paper we discuss some fundamental security issues of distributed systems of weak devices. We briefly describe two extreme kinds of such systems - the sensor network and theRadio Frequency IDentification (RFID) system from the point of view of security mechanisms designer. We describe some most important particularities and issues (including unsolved problems) that have to be taken into account in security design and analysis. Finally we present some fundamental concepts and paradigms of research on security of weak devices. In the paper we also give a brief survey of ultra–light HB/HB+ - family of encryption schemes and so-called predistribution protocols

Tag Ownership Transfer in Radio Frequency Identification Systems: A Survey of Existing Protocols and Open Challenges

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a modern approach to identify and track several assets at once in a supply chain environment. In many RFID applications, tagged items are frequently transferred from one owner to another. Thus, there is a need for secure ownership transfer (OT) protocols that can perform the transfer while, at the same time, protect the privacy of owners. Several protocols have been proposed in an attempt to fulfill this requirement. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive and systematic review of the RFID OT protocols that appeared over the years of 2005-2018. In addition, we compare these protocols based on the security goals which involve their support of OT properties and their resistance to attacks. From the presented comparison, we draw attention to the open issues in this field and provide suggestions for the direction that future research should follow. Furthermore, we suggest a set of guidelines to be considered in the design of new protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey that reviews the available OT protocols from the early start up to the current state of the art

A Secure Quorum Based Multi-Tag RFID System

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been expanded to be used in different fields that need automatic identifying and verifying of tagged objects without human intervention. RFID technology offers a great advantage in comparison with barcodes by providing accurate information, ease of use and reducing of labour cost. These advantages have been utilised by using passive RFID tags. Although RFID technology can enhance the efficiency of different RFID applications systems, researchers have reported issues regarding the use of RFID technology. These issues are making the technology vulnerable to many threats in terms of security and privacy. Different RFID solutions, based on different cryptography primitives, have been developed. Most of these protocols focus on the use of passive RFID tags. However, due to the computation feasibility in passive RFID tags, these tags might be vulnerable to some of the security and privacy threats. , e.g. unauthorised reader can read the information inside tags, illegitimate tags or cloned tags can be accessed by a reader. Moreover, most consideration of reserchers is focus on single tag authentication and mostly do not consider scenarios that need multi-tag such as supply chain management and healthcare management. Secret sharing schemes have been also proposed to overcome the key management problem in supply chain management. However, secret sharing schemes have some scalability limitations when applied with high numbers of RFID tags. This work is mainly focused on solving the problem of the security and privacy in multi-tag RFID based system. In this work firstly, we studied different RFID protocols such as symmetric key authentication protocols, authentication protocols based on elliptic curve cryptography, secret sharing schemes and multi-tag authentication protocols. Secondly, we consider the significant research into the mutual authentication of passive RFID tags. Therefore, a mutual authentication scheme that is based on zero-knowledge proof have been proposed . The main object of this work is to develop an ECC- RFID based system that enables multi-RFID tags to be authenticated with one reader by using different versions of ECC public key encryption schemes. The protocol are relied on using threshold cryptosystems that operate ECC to generate secret keys then distribute and stored secret keys among multi RFID tags. Finally, we provide performance measurement for the implementation of the proposed protocols.Ministry of higher education and scientific research, Baghdad-Ira

Novel Cryptographic Authentication Mechanisms for Supply Chains and OpenStack

In this dissertation, first, we studied the Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tag authentication problem in supply chains. RFID tags have been widely used as a low-cost wireless method for detecting counterfeit product injection in supply chains. We open a new direction toward solving this problem by using the Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) of recent RFID tags. We propose a method based on this direction that significantly improves the availability of the system and costs less. In our method, we introduce the notion of Software Unclonability, which is a kind of one-time MAC for authenticating random inputs. Also, we introduce three lightweight constructions that are software unclonable. Second, we focus on OpenStack that is a prestigious open-source cloud platform. OpenStack takes advantage of some tokening mechanisms to establish trust between its modules and users. It turns out that when an adversary captures user tokens by exploiting a bug in a module, he gets extreme power on behalf of users. Here, we propose a novel tokening mechanism that ties commands to tokens and enables OpenStack to support short life tokens while it keeps the performance up