Analogy, an Alternative Model. Critics to the standard model of analogical problems solving and proposals for an alternative one

Los autores realizaron una extensión de la crítica de Hofstadter al enfoque estándar sobre el pensamiento analógico, representado por la teoría de la proyección de la estructura de Gentner y la teoría de las múltiples restricciones de Holyoak y Thagard. Basados en esta extensión, propusieron un modelo no serial de solución de problemas por analogía. Contra el enfoque estándar, el modelo postula que: (a) las personas detectan y evalúan diferencias entre elementos puestos en correspondencia antes del subproceso de generación de inferencias y las consideran para controlar este subproceso, y (b) las propiedades de un elemento para un rol (PERs) juegan un rol crucial en estas operaciones de detección y evaluación, y también en los subprocesos post-inferenciales. Un experimento mostró que: (a) las personas detectan y evalúan la relevancia de diferencias entre elementos emparejados antes de la generación de inferencias, (b) inhiben las inferencias literales ante diferencias relevantes, y (c) detienen la transferencia ante diferencias insuperables. Los resultados mostraron también que las PERs base son reactivadas en diferentes momentos del proceso transferencial. Los datos obtenidos son incompatibles con el modelo estándar, que trata la generación de inferencias como un mecanismo sintáctico y excluye los análisis semánticos contextuales del estudio del proceso analógico.The authors made an extension of Hofstadter‘s criticisms against the standard approach in analogical thinking represented by the structure-mapping theory of Gentner and the multiconstraint theory of Holyoak and Thagard. Based on this extension, they proposed a non-serial model of analogical problem solving. Against the standard approach, the model postulates that: (a) people detect and evaluate differences between mapped elements before the subprocess of inference generation and consider them in order to control it, and (b) properties of an element that explain why the element could fill a certain role in the base problem resolution (PERs) play a crucial role in these detection and evaluation operations, and also in post-inferences subprocesses. An experiment showed that: (a) people detect and evaluate the relevance of differences between mapped elements before inference generation, (b) that they inhibit the generation of literal inferences when they face relevant differences, and (c) that they stop the subprocess when they recognize insuperable ones. The results also showed that base PERs are reactivated at different moments of analogical transfer. The data obtained are incompatible with the standard theories of analogical thinking, which treat inference generation as a syntactic mechanism and exclude contextual semantic analysis from the study of analogy.

Analogical asides on case-based reasoning

Abstract. This paper explores some of the similarities and differences between cognitive models of analogy and case-based reasoning systems. I first point out a paradox in the treatment of adaptation in analogy and in case-based reasoning; a paradox which can be only resolved by expanding the role of adaptation in cognitive models of analogy. Some psychological research on the process of adaptation in human subjects is reported and then the implications of this research are propagated into analogy and then on into CBR. The argument is that some of the existing stages in CBR should be integrated into a more stream-lined architecture that would be more efficient than current schemes. 1

Analogical asides on case-based reasoning

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