Preliminary specification and design documentation for software components to achieve catallaxy in computational systems

This Report is about the preliminary specifications and design documentation for software components to achieve Catallaxy in computational systems. -- Die Arbeit beschreibt die Spezifikation und das Design von Softwarekomponenten, um das Konzept der Katallaxie in Grid Systemen umzusetzen. Eine Einführung ordnet das Konzept der Katallaxie in bestehende Grid Taxonomien ein und stellt grundlegende Komponenten vor. Anschließend werden diese Komponenten auf ihre Anwendbarkeit in bestehenden Application Layer Netzwerken untersucht.Grid Computing

Socially Trusted Collaborative Edge Computing in Ultra Dense Networks

Small cell base stations (SBSs) endowed with cloud-like computing capabilities are considered as a key enabler of edge computing (EC), which provides ultra-low latency and location-awareness for a variety of emerging mobile applications and the Internet of Things. However, due to the limited computation resources of an individual SBS, providing computation services of high quality to its users faces significant challenges when it is overloaded with an excessive amount of computation workload. In this paper, we propose collaborative edge computing among SBSs by forming SBS coalitions to share computation resources with each other, thereby accommodating more computation workload in the edge system and reducing reliance on the remote cloud. A novel SBS coalition formation algorithm is developed based on the coalitional game theory to cope with various new challenges in small-cell-based edge systems, including the co-provisioning of radio access and computing services, cooperation incentives, and potential security risks. To address these challenges, the proposed method (1) allows collaboration at both the user-SBS association stage and the SBS peer offloading stage by exploiting the ultra dense deployment of SBSs, (2) develops a payment-based incentive mechanism that implements proportionally fair utility division to form stable SBS coalitions, and (3) builds a social trust network for managing security risks among SBSs due to collaboration. Systematic simulations in practical scenarios are carried out to evaluate the efficacy and performance of the proposed method, which shows that tremendous edge computing performance improvement can be achieved.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1010.4501 by other author

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

House price momentum and strategic complementarity

House prices exhibit substantially more momentum, positive autocorrelation in price changes, than existing theories can explain. I introduce an amplification mechanism to reconcile this discrepancy. Sellers do not set a unilaterally high or low list price because they face a concave demand curve: increasing the price of an above-average-priced house rapidly reduces its sale probability, but cutting the price of a below-average-priced house only slightly improves its sale probability. The resulting strategic complementarity amplifies frictions because sellers gradually adjust their price to stay near average. I provide empirical evidence for concave demand using a quantitative search model that amplifies momentum two- to threefold

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Real Estate Brokerage and the Hosting Market: An Annotated Bibliography

A number of facets of real estate brokerage have been examined over time in theoretical and empirical articles appearing in the literature. This article summarizes brokerage research and suggests avenues for future inquiry. In attempting to organize brokerage research, the research is classified into eight broad topical areas: (1) brokerage firm characteristics; (2) broker commissions; (3) time on the market; (4) broker compensation; (5) the effects of brokerage on house prices; (6) regulation of the brokerage industry; (7) legal liability; and (8) international comparisons. In each area, we point out the major focus of the research by summarizing important findings.

Price Variations in a Stock Market With Many Agents

Large variations in stock prices happen with sufficient frequency to raise doubts about existing models, which all fail to account for non-Gaussian statistics. We construct simple models of a stock market, and argue that the large variations may be due to a crowd effect, where agents imitate each other's behavior. The variations over different time scales can be related to each other in a systematic way, similar to the Levy stable distribution proposed by Mandelbrot to describe real market indices. In the simplest, least realistic case, exact results for the statistics of the variations are derived by mapping onto a model of diffusing and annihilating particles, which has been solved by quantum field theory methods. When the agents imitate each other and respond to recent market volatility, different scaling behavior is obtained. In this case the statistics of price variations is consistent with empirical observations. The interplay between ``rational'' traders whose behavior is derived from fundamental analysis of the stock, including dividends, and ``noise traders'', whose behavior is governed solely by studying the market dynamics, is investigated. When the relative number of rational traders is small, ``bubbles'' often occur, where the market price moves outside the range justified by fundamental market analysis. When the number of rational traders is larger, the market price is generally locked within the price range they define.Comment: 39 pages (Latex) + 20 Figures and missing Figure 1 (sorry), submitted to J. Math. Eco