24,075 research outputs found
Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is
approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of
valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and
subadditive. We obtain our learning results in two settings. The first is the
commonly studied setting where sample access to the bidders' distributions over
valuations is given, for both regular distributions and arbitrary distributions
with bounded support. Our algorithms require polynomially many samples in the
number of items and bidders. The second is a more general max-min learning
setting that we introduce, where we are given "approximate distributions," and
we seek to compute an auction whose revenue is approximately optimal
simultaneously for all "true distributions" that are close to the given ones.
These results are more general in that they imply the sample-based results, and
are also applicable in settings where we have no sample access to the
underlying distributions but have estimated them indirectly via market research
or by observation of previously run, potentially non-truthful auctions.
Our results hold for valuation distributions satisfying the standard (and
necessary) independence-across-items property. They also generalize and improve
upon recent works, which have provided algorithms that learn approximately
optimal auctions in more restricted settings with additive, subadditive and
unit-demand valuations using sample access to distributions. We generalize
these results to the complete unit-demand, additive, and XOS setting, to i.i.d.
subadditive bidders, and to the max-min setting.
Our results are enabled by new uniform convergence bounds for hypotheses
classes under product measures. Our bounds result in exponential savings in
sample complexity compared to bounds derived by bounding the VC dimension, and
are of independent interest.Comment: Appears in FOCS 201
airline revenue management
With the increasing interest in decision support systems and the continuous advance of computer science, revenue management is a discipline which has received a great deal of interest in recent years. Although revenue management has seen many new applications throughout the years, the main focus of research continues to be the airline industry. Ever since Littlewood (1972) first proposed a solution method for the airline revenue management problem, a variety of solution methods have been introduced. In this paper we will give an overview of the solution methods presented throughout the literature.revenue management;seat inventory control;OR techniques;mathematical programming
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
Investigating potential purchases is often a substantial investment under
uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or English auctions,
compound this with uncertainty about the price a bidder will have to pay in
order to win. As a result they tend to confuse the process of search both by
leading to wasteful information acquisition on goods that have already found a
good purchaser and by discouraging needed investigations of objects,
potentially eliminating all gains from trade. In contrast, we show that the
Dutch auction preserves all of its properties from a standard setting without
information costs because it guarantees, at the time of information
acquisition, a price at which the good can be purchased. Calibrations to
start-up acquisition and timber auctions suggest that in practice the social
losses through poor search coordination in standard formats are an order of
magnitude or two larger than the (negligible) inefficiencies arising from
ex-ante bidder asymmetries.Comment: JEL Classification: D44, D47, D82, D83. 117 pages, of which 74 are
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