Fairs for e-commerce: the benefits of aggregating buyers and sellers

In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed and tends to rise. Other models, including group-buying, are based on cooperation between users, characterized by a dynamic price of the product that tends to go down. There is not yet a business model in which both sellers and buyers are grouped in order to negotiate on a specific product or service. The present study investigates a new extension of the group-buying model, called fair, which allows aggregation of demand and supply for price optimization, in a cooperative manner. Additionally, our system also aggregates products and destinations for shipping optimization. We introduced the following new relevant input parameters in order to implement a double-side aggregation: (a) price-quantity curves provided by the seller; (b) waiting time, that is, the longer buyers wait, the greater discount they get; (c) payment time, which determines if the buyer pays before, during or after receiving the product; (d) the distance between the place where products are available and the place of shipment, provided in advance by the buyer or dynamically suggested by the system. To analyze the proposed model we implemented a system prototype and a simulator that allow to study effects of changing some input parameters. We analyzed the dynamic price model in fairs having one single seller and a combination of selected sellers. The results are very encouraging and motivate further investigation on this topic

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers.Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous time, Markov perfect equilibrium

Tie-in sales and banks

Antitrust law ; Banks and banking

Pricing and Time on the Market for Residential Properties in a Major U.K. City

The pricing and length of time to sell single-family residential properties is a function of the interaction between buyer and seller behavior. This study estimates value effects in relation to the time on the market for residential properties within the Belfast (U.K).metropolitan area. Three distinctive characteristics of market are highlighted. First, the majority of sales are at a premium to the list price. Second, different factors influence time on the market for premium and discount sales. Third, the marketing period is examined for three events: listing to sales agreement, sales agreement to completion, and listing to completion.