Quantum sealed-bid auction using a modified scheme for multiparty circular quantum key agreement

A feasible, secure and collusion-attack-free quantum sealed-bid auction protocol is proposed using a modified scheme for multi-party circular quantum key agreement. In the proposed protocol, the set of all ($n$) bidders is grouped in to $l$ subsets (sub-circles) in such a way that only the initiator (who prepares the quantum state to be distributed for a particular round of communication and acts as the receiver in that round) is a member of all the subsets (sub-circles) prepared for a particular round, while any other bidder is part of only a single subset. All $n$ bidders and auctioneer initiate one round of communication, and each of them prepares $l$ copies of a $\left(r-1\right)$-partite entangled state (one for each sub-circle), where $r=\frac{n}{l}+1$. The efficiency and security\textcolor{blue}{{} }of the proposed protocol are critically analyzed. It is shown that the proposed protocol is free from the collusion attacks that are possible on the existing schemes of quantum sealed-bid auction. Further, it is observed that the security against collusion attack increases with the increase in $l$, but that reduces the complexity (number of entangled qubits in each entangled state) of the entangled states to be used and that makes the scheme scalable and implementable with the available technologies. The additional security and scalability is shown to arise due to the use of a circular structure in place of a complete-graph or tree-type structure used earlier.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figure

Quantum Private Comparison: A Review

As an important branch of quantum secure multiparty computation, quantum private comparison (QPC) has attracted more and more attention recently. In this paper, according to the quantum implementation mechanism that these protocols used, we divide these protocols into three categories: The quantum cryptography QPC, the superdense coding QPC, and the entanglement swapping QPC. And then, a more in-depth analysis on the research progress, design idea, and substantive characteristics of corresponding QPC categories is carried out, respectively. Finally, the applications of QPC and quantum secure multi-party computation issues are discussed and, in addition, three possible research mainstream directions are pointed out

Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.Comment: 26 pages, 6 fgures; IEEE Journals on Selected Areas in Communications, 201

Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor