Stacco: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves

Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer network communications, has been broadly deployed for a secure communication channel. However, in this paper, we show that the marriage between SGX and SSL may not be smooth sailing. Particularly, we consider a category of side-channel attacks against SSL/TLS implementations in secure enclaves, which we call the control-flow inference attacks. In these attacks, the malicious operating system kernel may perform a powerful man-in-the-kernel attack to collect execution traces of the enclave programs at page, cacheline, or branch level, while positioning itself in the middle of the two communicating parties. At the center of our work is a differential analysis framework, dubbed Stacco, to dynamically analyze the SSL/TLS implementations and detect vulnerabilities that can be exploited as decryption oracles. Surprisingly, we found exploitable vulnerabilities in the latest versions of all the SSL/TLS libraries we have examined. To validate the detected vulnerabilities, we developed a man-in-the-kernel adversary to demonstrate Bleichenbacher attacks against the latest OpenSSL library running in the SGX enclave (with the help of Graphene) and completely broke the PreMasterSecret encrypted by a 4096-bit RSA public key with only 57286 queries. We also conducted CBC padding oracle attacks against the latest GnuTLS running in Graphene-SGX and an open-source SGX-implementation of mbedTLS (i.e., mbedTLS-SGX) that runs directly inside the enclave, and showed that it only needs 48388 and 25717 queries, respectively, to break one block of AES ciphertext. Empirical evaluation suggests these man-in-the-kernel attacks can be completed within 1 or 2 hours.Comment: CCS 17, October 30-November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, US

CoVE: Towards Confidential Computing on RISC-V Platforms

Multi-tenant computing platforms are typically comprised of several software and hardware components including platform firmware, host operating system kernel, virtualization monitor, and the actual tenant payloads that run on them (typically in a virtual machine, container, or application). This model is well established in large scale commercial deployment, but the downside is that all platform components and operators are in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the tenant. This aspect is ill-suited for privacy-oriented workloads that aim to minimize the TCB footprint. Confidential computing presents a good stepping-stone towards providing a quantifiable TCB for computing. Confidential computing [1] requires the use of a HW-attested Trusted Execution Environments for data-in-use protection. The RISC-V architecture presents a strong foundation for meeting the requirements for Confidential Computing and other security paradigms in a clean slate manner. This paper describes a reference architecture and discusses ISA, non-ISA and system-on-chip (SoC) requirements for confidential computing on RISC-V Platforms. It discusses proposed ISA and non-ISA Extension for Confidential Virtual Machine for RISC-V platforms, referred to as CoVE

MURAC: A unified machine model for heterogeneous computers

Includes bibliographical referencesHeterogeneous computing enables the performance and energy advantages of multiple distinct processing architectures to be efficiently exploited within a single machine. These systems are capable of delivering large performance increases by matching the applications to architectures that are most suited to them. The Multiple Runtime-reconfigurable Architecture Computer (MURAC) model has been proposed to tackle the problems commonly found in the design and usage of these machines. This model presents a system-level approach that creates a clear separation of concerns between the system implementer and the application developer. The three key concepts that make up the MURAC model are a unified machine model, a unified instruction stream and a unified memory space. A simple programming model built upon these abstractions provides a consistent interface for interacting with the underlying machine to the user application. This programming model simplifies application partitioning between hardware and software and allows the easy integration of different execution models within the single control ow of a mixed-architecture application. The theoretical and practical trade-offs of the proposed model have been explored through the design of several systems. An instruction-accurate system simulator has been developed that supports the simulated execution of mixed-architecture applications. An embedded System-on-Chip implementation has been used to measure the overhead in hardware resources required to support the model, which was found to be minimal. An implementation of the model within an operating system on a tightly-coupled reconfigurable processor platform has been created. This implementation is used to extend the software scheduler to allow for the full support of mixed-architecture applications in a multitasking environment. Different scheduling strategies have been tested using this scheduler for mixed-architecture applications. The design and implementation of these systems has shown that a unified abstraction model for heterogeneous computers provides important usability benefits to system and application designers. These benefits are achieved through a consistent view of the multiple different architectures to the operating system and user applications. This allows them to focus on achieving their performance and efficiency goals by gaining the benefits of different execution models during runtime without the complex implementation details of the system-level synchronisation and coordination

Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims to enforce hardware-assisted isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the confidential computing's new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructure. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code, offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel

Ejafa_protocol: A custom INC secure protocol

"EJAFA_PROTOCOL: A CUSTOM INC SECURE PROTOCOL" presents a cryptographic solution tailored for lightweight devices, striking a delicate balance between security and efficiency. The protocol incorporates modern cryptographic primitives, including X25519 for key exchange and ChaCha20 for encryption, while adhering to established RFC standards. The report explores the protocol's design, implementation over various network protocols, and its performance characteristics. A key feature of the protocol is its adaptability to resource-constrained environments without compromising on security. This work contributes to the evolving landscape of secure communication protocols, providing a robust solution for practical deployment across a spectrum of applications.Comment: Advanced Computer Network Course,Peking University,Beijing,Chin

Enhancing an embedded processor core for efficient and isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms

We propose enhancing a reconfigurable and extensible embedded RISC processor core with a protected zone for isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms. The protected zone is a collection of processor subsystems such as functional units optimized for high-speed execution of integer operations, a small amount of local memory for storing sensitive data during cryptographic computations, and special-purpose and cryptographic registers to execute instructions securely. We outline the principles for secure software implementations of cryptographic algorithms in a processor equipped with the proposed protected zone. We demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed zone by implementing the most-commonly used cryptographic algorithms in the protected zone; namely RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, pairing-based cryptography, AES block cipher, and SHA-1 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash functions. In terms of time efficiency, our software implementations of cryptographic algorithms running on the enhanced core compare favorably with equivalent software implementations on similar processors reported in the literature. The protected zone is designed in such a modular fashion that it can easily be integrated into any RISC processor. The proposed enhancements for the protected zone are realized on an FPGA device. The implementation results on the FPGA confirm that its area overhead is relatively moderate in the sense that it can be used in many embedded processors. Finally, the protected zone is useful against cold-boot and micro-architectural side-channel attacks such as cache-based and branch prediction attacks