A Note on the Equivalence of Rationalizability Concepts in Generalized Nice Games

Moulin (1984) describes the class of nice games for which the solution concept of point-rationalizability coincides with iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. As a consequence nice games have the desirable property that all rationalizability concepts determine the same strategic solution. However, nice games are characterized by rather strong assumptions. For example, only single-valued best responses are admitted and the individual strategy sets have to be convex and compact subsets of the real line R1. This note shows that equivalence of all rationalizability concepts can be extended to multi-valued best response correspondences. The surprising finding is that equivalence does not hold for individual strategy sets that are compact and convex subsets of Rn with n>1.

English Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong effect of even small toeholds, however we find the effects are not so strong in the lab. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to relatively costless deviations from the equilibrium strategies. We find that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better than the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring. Finally our results show that in general the seller’s revenues fall when the playing field is uneven.Experiments, toehold auction, takeover, payoff, flatness, quantal response, level-k, LeeX

A simple axiomatization and constructive representation proof for Choquet Expexted Utility

We provide a set of simple and intuitive axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty

A Simple Axiomatization and Constructive Representation Proof for Choquet Expected Utility

We provide a set of simple and intuitive axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.

Modeling the Use of Nonrenewable Resources Using a Genetic Algorithm

This paper shows, how a genetic algorithm (GA) can be used to model an economic process: the interaction of profit-maximizing oil-exploration firms that compete with each other for a limited amount of oil. After a brief introduction to the concept of multi-agent-modeling in economics, a GA-based resource-economic model is developed. Several model runs based on different economic policy assumptions are presented and discussed in order to show how the GA-model can be used to gain insight into the dynamic properties of economic systems. The remainder outlines deficiencies of GA-based multi-agent approaches and sketches how the present model can be improved.

Uniqueness Conditions for Point-Rationalizable

The unique point-rationalizable solution of a game is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, this solution has the additional advantage that it can be justified by the epistemic assumption that it is Common Knowledge of the players that only best responses are chosen. Thus, games with a unique point-rationalizable solution allow for a plausible explanation of equilibrium play in one-shot strategic situations, and it is therefore desireable to identify such games. In order to derive sufficient and necessary conditions for unique point-rationalizable solutions this paper adopts and generalizes the contraction-property approach of Moulin (1984) and of Bernheim (1984). Uniqueness results obtained in this paper are derived under fairly general assumptions such as games with arbitrary metrizable strategy sets and are especially useful for complete and bounded, for compact, as well as for finite strategy sets. As a mathematical side result existence of a unique fixed point is proved under conditions that generalize a fixed point theorem due to Edelstein (1962).

The Effect of Bidding Information in Ascending Auctions.

We study the effect of the drop out and reenter information in an environment where bidders' values involve both private and common value components. We find that (1) providing bidding information does not have a significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. (2) The effect of information on winner's expected profit depends on the range of uncertainty of the common value component and the level of Nash profit prediction, which the auctioneer has no a priori knowledge. In our environment, where bidders have a private component to their value and the auction takes place in ascending clock format, (3) bidders do not suffer from the winner's curse when information is not provided. (4) Information substantially increases the variability of revenue and winner?s profit when the range of uncertainty of the common value component is large. (5) Bidders? response to information depends on the range of uncertainty.

Security And Potential Level Preferences With

The security level models of Gilboa (1988) and of Jaffray (1988) as well as the security and potential level model of Cohen (1992) accomodate succesfully classical Allais paradoxa while they offer an interesting explanation for their occurrence. However, experimental data suggest a systematic violation of these models when lotteries with low probabilities of bad or good outcomes are involved. The present paper develops an axiomatic model that allows for thresholds in the perception of security and potential levels. The derived representation of preferences accommodates the observed violations of the original security and potential level models and provides a natural explanation for their occurence. Additionally, a more fundamental problem of the original models is resolved.

Spatial Dynamic Modeling and Urban Land Use Transformation:

Assessing the economic impacts of urban land use transformation has become complex and acrimonious. Although community planners are beginning to comprehend the economic trade-offs inherent in transforming the urban fringe, they find it increasingly difficult to analyze and assess the trade-offs expediently and in ways that can influence local decisionmaking. New and sophisticated spatial modeling techniques are now being applied to urban systems that can quickly assess the probable spatial outcomes of given communal policies. Applying an economic impact assessment to the probable spatial patterns can provide to planners the tools needed to quickly assess scenarios for policy formation that will ultimately help inform decision makers. This paper focuses on the theoretical underpinnings and practical application of an economic impact analysis submodel developed within the Land use Evolution and Impact Assessment Modeling (LEAM) environment. The conceptual framework of LEAM is described, followed by an application of the model to the assessment of the cost of urban sprawl in Kane County, Illinois. The results show the effectiveness of spatially explicit modeling from a theoretical and a practical point of view. The agent-based approach of spatial dynamic modeling with a high spatial resolution allows for discerning the macro-level implications of micro-level behaviors. These phenomena are highlighted in the economic submodel in the discussion of the implications of land use change decisions on individual and communal costs; low-density development patterns favoring individual behaviors at the expense of the broader community.