ENTRY INTO FARMING: THE EFFECTS OF LEASING AND LEVERAGE ON FIRM SURVIVAL

Agribusiness,

Risk-sharing and Liability in the Control of Stochastic Externalities

This paper analyzes alternative policies for controlling stochastic externalities, considering both the incentive and the risk-sharing effects of each. When polluter actions are unobservable so that regulation is not possible, alternative liability rules including zero, partial, and full liability are compared. When actions are observable, then regulation is possible, and the use of regulation is compared to the use of liability. The principal-agent paradigm provides the analytical approach used to determine the efficient policy choice. The effect of the availability of insurance is also addressed. This paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for the control of stochastic marine pollution.Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,

Corporate Governance, Opaque Bank Activities, and Risk/Return Efficiency: Pre- and Post-Crisis Evidence from Turkey

Does better corporate governance unambiguously improve the risk/return efficiency of banks? Or does either a re-orientation of banks' revenue mix towards more opaque products, an economic downturn, or tighter supervision create off-setting or reinforcing effects? The authors relate bank efficiency to shortfalls from a stochastic risk/return frontier. They analyze how internal governance mechanisms (CEO duality, board experience, political connections, and education profile) and external governance mechanisms (discipline exerted by shareholders, depositors, or skilled employees) determine efficiency in a sample of Turkish banks. The 2000 financial crisis was a wakeup call for bank efficiency and corporate governance. As a result, better corporate governance mechanisms have been able to improve risk/return efficiency when the economic, regulatory, and supervisory environments are more stable and bank products are more complex.corporate governance;bank risk;noninterest income;crisis;frontier

Master’s Program in Money and Finance (MMF)

The Master’s program in Money and Finance (MMF) is an innovative joint venture of the Department of Money and Macroeconomics and of the Department of Finance, both located in the new House of Finance. The program offers promising students from all over the world an intellectually stimulating and challenging setting in which to prepare for their professional careers in central banking, commercial banking, insurance and other financial services. By being located in Frankfurt, one of the world's leading financial centers and the only city in the world with two central banks (the ECB and the German Bundesbank), it offers unique opportunities for interaction with practitioners. The program is taught exclusively in English; knowledge of German is not required for admission to, or completion of the program. It has been designed with a view to establishing itself as a leading Masters program integrating studies in monetary economics, macroeconomics and finance and a major gateway to high-profile jobs in the banking and financial sector

Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis

The risks confronted by grain and cotton farmers are of particular interest, given the changing role of the Government after passage of the 1996 Farm Act. With the shift toward less government intervention in the post-1996 Farm Act environment, a more sophisticated understanding of risk and risk management is important to help producers make better decisions in risky situations and to assist policymakers in assessing the effectiveness of different types of risk protection tools. In response, this report provides a rigorous, yet accessible, description of risk and risk management tools and strategies at the farm level. It also provides never-before-published data on farmers' assessments of the risks they face, their use of alternative risk management strategies, and the changes they would make if faced with financial difficulty. It also compares price risk across crops and time periods, and provides detailed information on yield variability.crop insurance, diversification, futures contracts, leasing, leveraging, liquidity, livestock insurance, marketing contracts, options contracts, production contracts, revenue insurance, risk, vertical integration, Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,

Corporate Governance, Opaque Bank Activities, and Risk/Return Efficiency: Pre- and Post-Crisis Evidence from Turkey

Does better corporate governance unambiguously improve the risk/return efficiency of banks? Or does either a re-orientation of banks' revenue mix towards more opaque products, an economic downturn, or tighter supervision create off-setting or reinforcing effects? The authors relate bank efficiency to shortfalls from a stochastic risk/return frontier. They analyze how internal governance mechanisms (CEO duality, board experience, political connections, and education profile) and external governance mechanisms (discipline exerted by shareholders, depositors, or skilled employees) determine efficiency in a sample of Turkish banks. The 2000 financial crisis was a wakeup call for bank efficiency and corporate governance. As a result, better corporate governance mechanisms have been able to improve risk/return efficiency when the economic, regulatory, and supervisory environments are more stable and bank products are more complex.corporate governance;bank risk;noninterest income;crisis;frontier