Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form

Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.Climate Change Modelling, International Environmental Agreements, Non-cooperative Game Theory, Technology Spillovers

Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia

Malaysia’s admirable economic growth is often attributed to liberal, open economic policies. Aggregate measures of openness, however, often veil the way coalitional politics drove illiberal government intervention in the economy to correct ethnically based economic inequality, create national heavy industries, and favor politically well-connected entrepreneurs. A more nuanced analysis reveals a complex mix of liberal and illiberal economic policies designed to balance competing coalitional interests. These policies created a “dual economy” that successfully replaced growing political and social instability with rapid economic growth sufficient to support redistributive politics. Yet this same dual economy also slowed further reform and retarded technological development, leaving Malaysia mired in mediocrity: neither price competitive with China nor technologically competitive with Singapore, the East Asian NICs, or the OECD countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40041/3/wp655.pd

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.IEA’s, Coalitional stability, Dynamics

Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia

Malaysia’s admirable economic growth is often attributed to liberal, open economic policies. Aggregate measures of openness, however, often veil the way coalitional politics drove illiberal government intervention in the economy to correct ethnically based economic inequality, create national heavy industries, and favor politically well-connected entrepreneurs. A more nuanced analysis reveals a complex mix of liberal and illiberal economic policies designed to balance competing coalitional interests. These policies created a “dual economy” that successfully replaced growing political and social instability with rapid economic growth sufficient to support redistributive politics. Yet this same dual economy also slowed further reform and retarded technological development, leaving Malaysia mired in mediocrity: neither price competitive with China nor technologically competitive with Singapore, the East Asian NICs, or the OECD countries.Malaysia, Economic Reform, Technological Upgrading, Coalitions, Dualism

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Algorithm for Computations

Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.Strategic bargaining, Non-monolithic players, Scission, Noncooperative game-theory

Informational Warfare

Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that reputation was an important mediator of access to resources in ancestral human environments. Reputations were built and maintained by the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the actions and capabilities of group members-that is, by gossiping. Strategic gossiping would have been an excellent strategy for manipulating reputations and thereby competing effectively for resources and for cooperative relationships with group members who could best provide such resources. Coalitions (cliques) may have increased members' abilities to manipulate reputations by gossiping. Because, over evolutionary time, women may have experienced more within-group competition than men, and because female reputations may have been more vulnerable than male reputations to gossip, gossiping may have been a more important strategy for women than men. Consequently, women may have evolved specializations for gossiping alone and in coalitions. We develop and partially test this theory

Does Alliance Formation between National Labor Unions and National Environmental Organizations Exist?

Does alliance formation between national labor unions and national environmental organizations exist? Seven national labor unions and seven national environmental organizations that are representative of the two movements are selected for examination by this study to address this question. The project gathers and analyzes three types of data: documents on the web sites of the selected organizations, interviews with high ranked officials from many of the organizations examined and the hyperlinks or web links from each organization’s web page. An analysis of the document of the web sites and interviews with high ranking officials identifies three issues that national labor unions and national environmental organizations share: global trade/globalization, corporate accountability and human exposure to toxic chemicals. Next, the study examines the hyperlinks from the web sites to discover if they demonstrate a connection between national labor unions, and national environmental organizations. The study found minimal direct web links between national labor unions and national environmental organizations. From the document analysis of the web sites and the interviews conducted with high ranking officials, Warren’s (1967) typology of coalitional (temporary coalitions) and federative (permanent coalitions) arrangement is used to order the efforts of national labor unions and environmental organizations to work together. The AFL-CIO is included among the assessment of organizations participating in coalitional and federative arrangements. Twenty-one coalitional arrangements and 6 federative arrangements are discovered by this study. The majority of coalitional arrangements and 3 of the 6 federative arrangements are associated with the issue of global trade/globalization. The other coalitional and federative arrangements are associated with the issues of corporate accountability, human exposure to toxic chemicals and energy. The issue of energy as a cooperative issue emerged from the discovered coalitional arrangements. The findings of the study indicate that among national labor unions and national environment organizations, industrial labor unions and environmental lobbying organizations have the greatest success in working together. Overall, the ability of national labor unions and national environmental organizations to work together appears to be limited by their lack of shared issues and their inability to align the frames of the issues they do share. Many indicators suggest that national labor unions and national environmental organizations are moving farther away from working together. Besides the lack of shared issues, the factors of conflicts between the labor and the environmental movements, the difficulty of adopting a social justice frame, the adverse political climate, the relationship of the labor and environmental movements to capital/business, the lack of acknowledging coalitional and federative arrangements, the lack of building federative arrangements, and the general difficulties of trying to work together limit cooperation between national labor unions and national environmental organizations. These findings are discussed using a synthesis of the framing perspective, resource mobilization, and the political process model/political opportunity perspective as suggested by Oliver and Myers (2003). The project concludes with an overview of findings, questions for future research and policy recommendations that could improve the ability of national labor unions and environmental organizations to work together