An analysis of New South Wales electronic vote counting

We re-examine the 2012 local government elections in New South Wales, Australia. The count was conducted electronically using a randomised form of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). It was already well known that randomness does make a difference to outcomes in some seats. We describe how the process could be amended to include a demonstration that the randomness was chosen fairly. Second, and more significantly, we found an error in the official counting software, which caused a mistake in the count in the council of Griffith, where candidate Rina Mercuri narrowly missed out on a seat. We believe the software error incorrectly decreased Mercuri's winning probability to about 10%---according to our count she should have won with 91% probability. The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) corrected their code when we pointed out the error, and made their own announcement. We have since investigated the 2016 local government election (held after correcting the error above) and found two new errors. We notified the NSWEC about these errors a few days after they posted the results

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Computing the Margin of Victory in Preferential Parliamentary Elections

We show how to use automated computation of election margins to assess the number of votes that would need to change in order to alter a parliamentary outcome for single-member preferential electorates. In the context of increasing automation of Australian electoral processes, and accusations of deliberate interference in elections in Europe and the USA, this work forms the basis of a rigorous statistical audit of the parliamentary election outcome. Our example is the New South Wales Legislative Council election of 2015, but the same process could be used for any similar parliament for which data was available, such as the Australian House of Representatives given the proposed automatic scanning of ballots

Voter ID

The question of whether voters should be required to present an acceptable form of identification (ID) when casting a ballot at a federal election has persisted. Executive summary The question of whether voters should be required to present an acceptable form of identification (ID) when casting a ballot at a federal election has persisted, notwithstanding quite exhaustive debate and deliberation in numerous forums. Arguments advanced in favour of requiring voter ID included the need to: protect the integrity of the information contained on the roll deter attempts by voters to impersonate another voter discourage attempts by a voter to vote more than once. In 2001, in its report User friendly, not abuser friendly: Report of the inquiry into the integrity of the electoral roll, the Joint Standing Committee of Electoral Matters (JSCEM) concluded that that the introduction of voter identification was not warranted as a measure to deter fraud But while some consider that the level of alleged electoral fraud is minuscule, others have a much more pessimistic view. The report of the JSCEM Inquiry into the conduct of the 2001 Federal election addressed proof-of-identity requirements, but focussed on initial enrolment or re-enrolment, not the requirement to produce ID in the normal course of casting a ballot at a polling booth. The Committee recommended ‘that people making a first-time enrolment, those seeking re-enrolment, and those transferring their enrolment details, first be required to provide proof of identity and address, via a driver’s licence or similar. But evidence to that same JSCEM inquiry highlighted problems with the ready availability of ID among people who are extremely disadvantaged or living in Indigenous communities. Others argued that the alleged difficulties of producing ID are over stated, citing the numbers that attend large sports clubs or present ID to access video stores. Australians have a history of resistance to the adoption of any kind of universal ID card that can be legally required to be shown in order to access government services or to confirm one’s identity. The arguments against such a card are broadly couched in terms of personal privacy and an aversion to a ‘surveillance state’

Internet voting in Australian election systems

This paper explores how internet voting could offer potential improvements in the way elections are managed and delivered in Australia. Aims The issue of internet voting is one of the more testing ones currently faced by election administrators, not least because of the diversity of views which it generates. Proponents of such a use of the internet see it as a potentially powerful, and perhaps inevitable, way of enabling electors, or certain categories of electors, to vote in a convenient and efficient way. In the long term, it holds out the revolutionary prospect that the classical vision of direct democracy could be realised, with voters being able to make fast collective decisions on a wide range of issues. Opponents of internet voting see it as giving rise to major risks to the integrity of electoral processes. There is a large and rapidly growing literature on the subject. The aims of this paper are: to explore a range of significant issues relevant to community consideration of the appropriate role for internet voting in Australia; and to identify some areas where internet voting may have potential value (subject to the satisfactory resolution of outstanding technical issues and a determination that any residual risks can be mitigated or deemed acceptable), and therefore to warrant more detailed consideration

The Curious Dawn of American Public Schools

Three factors help to explain why school enrollments in the Northern United States were higher than those in the South and in most of Europe by 1850. One was affordability: the northern states had higher real incomes, cheaper teachers, and greater local tax support. The second was the greater autonomy of local governments. The third was the greater diffusion of voting power among the citizenry in much of the North, especially in rural communities. The distribution of local political voice appears to be a robust predictor of tax support and enrollments, both within and between regions.