Measuring the Quality of Financial Electronic Payment System: Combined with Fuzzy AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS

The study aims to apply Fuzzy AHP in TOPSIS to discuss the key factors that foster the success of current third-party online payment platforms. This study organized the quality measurements into four categories and eleven sub-categories. The AHP in TOPSIS is applied to calculate the weighted averages of all categories and sub-categories to measure the quality of third-party online payment platforms. This study finds that “safety quality” is the most emphasized category, “system quality” is the second, “communication quality” is the third, and “service quality” is the least emphasized

A Systematic Review on Search Engine Advertising

The innovation of Search Engine Advertising (SEA) was first introduced in 1998. It soon became a very popular tool among practitioners for promoting their websites on the Web and turned into a billion dollar revenue source for search engines. In parallel with its rapid growth in use, SEA attracted the attention of academic researchers resulting in a large number of publications on the topic of SEA. However, no comprehensive review of this accumulated body of knowledge is currently available. This shortcoming has motivated us to conduct a systematic review of SEA literature. Herewith, we searched for and collected 101 papers on the topic of SEA, published in 72 journals from different disciplines and analyzed them to answer the research questions for this study. We have identified the historical development of SEA literature, predominant journals in the publication of SEA research, active reference disciplines as well as the main researchers in the field of SEA. Moreover, we have classified SEA literature into four categories and 10 research topics. We also uncovered a number of gaps in SEA literature and provided future research direction accordingly. Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/pajais/vol7/iss3/2

An optimal mechanism for sponsored search auctions on the web and comparison with other mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the Web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction - generalized second price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity