2 research outputs found
Electt: running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments
We present a system for running auditable and verifiable elections in
untrusted environments. Votes are anonymous since the order of candidates on a
ballot sheet is random. Tellers see only the position of the candidate. Voters
can check their vote. An election is auditable using blockchain log.
Threshold-encryption, which is used to implement the quorum, prevents a
deadlock from occurring if a minority of candidates or observers tries to
sabotage the election. Candidates and observers can indicate that the election
was free and fair by exposing their keys, which are used by the system to
decrypt each vote. Ballot sheets are encrypted by onion-routing, which has a
layer with the key of the election instance, so it's impossible for a quorum to
decode the results before they have announced their decision by exposing their
keys. A register of voters ensures that only verified voters can vote without
compromising their identity. If there any doubts about the identity of a voter,
their vote can be excluded from the election, if a quorum agrees. This system
is designed to scale from one instance to a distributed system that runs over
an unlimited number of instances, which can be achieved using cloud instances
or smartphones belonging to voters or tellers.Comment: 21 pages plus glossary because English languages are quite different
when we speak about the electio
An Overview of End-to-End Verifiable Voting Systems
Advances in E2E verifiable voting have the potential to fundamentally restore
trust in elections and democratic processes in society. In this chapter, we
provide a comprehensive introduction to the field. We trace the evolution of
privacy and verifiability properties in the research literature and describe
the operations of current state-of-the-art E2E voting systems. We also discuss
outstanding challenges to the deployment of E2E voting systems, including
technical, legal, and usability constraints.
Our intention, in writing this chapter, has been to make the innovations in
this domain accessible to a wider audience. We have therefore eschewed
description of complex cryptographic mechanisms and instead attempt to
communicate the fundamental intuition behind the design of E2E voting systems.
We hope our work serves as a useful resource and assists in the future
development of E2E voting.Comment: This is a self-archived version of a chapter due to appear in the
book "Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment", edited
by Feng Hao and Peter Y. A. Ryan, part of the Series in Security, Privacy and
Trust published by CRC Press, 201