An Efficient Private Evaluation of a Decision Graph

A decision graph is a well-studied classifier and has been used to solve many real-world problems. We assumed a typical scenario between two parties in this study, in which one holds a decision graph and the other wants to know the class label of his/her query without disclosing the graph and query to the other. We propose a novel protocol for this scenario that can obliviously evaluate a graph that is designed by an efficient data structure called the graph level order unary degree sequence (GLOUDS). The time and communication complexities of this protocol are linear to the number of nodes in the graph and do not include any exponential factors. The experiment results revealed that the actual runtime and communication size were well concordant with theoretical complexities. Our method can process a graph with approximately 500 nodes in only 11 s on a standard laptop computer. We also compared the runtime of our method with that of previous methods and confirmed that it was one order of magnitude faster than the previous methods

Formalizing Mathematical Knowledge as a Biform Theory Graph: A Case Study

A biform theory is a combination of an axiomatic theory and an algorithmic theory that supports the integration of reasoning and computation. These are ideal for formalizing algorithms that manipulate mathematical expressions. A theory graph is a network of theories connected by meaning-preserving theory morphisms that map the formulas of one theory to the formulas of another theory. Theory graphs are in turn well suited for formalizing mathematical knowledge at the most convenient level of abstraction using the most convenient vocabulary. We are interested in the problem of whether a body of mathematical knowledge can be effectively formalized as a theory graph of biform theories. As a test case, we look at the graph of theories encoding natural number arithmetic. We used two different formalisms to do this, which we describe and compare. The first is realized in ${\rm CTT}_{\rm uqe}$, a version of Church's type theory with quotation and evaluation, and the second is realized in Agda, a dependently typed programming language.Comment: 43 pages; published without appendices in: H. Geuvers et al., eds, Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM 2017), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 10383, pp. 9-24, Springer, 201

A Multi-view Context-aware Approach to Android Malware Detection and Malicious Code Localization

Existing Android malware detection approaches use a variety of features such as security sensitive APIs, system calls, control-flow structures and information flows in conjunction with Machine Learning classifiers to achieve accurate detection. Each of these feature sets provides a unique semantic perspective (or view) of apps' behaviours with inherent strengths and limitations. Meaning, some views are more amenable to detect certain attacks but may not be suitable to characterise several other attacks. Most of the existing malware detection approaches use only one (or a selected few) of the aforementioned feature sets which prevent them from detecting a vast majority of attacks. Addressing this limitation, we propose MKLDroid, a unified framework that systematically integrates multiple views of apps for performing comprehensive malware detection and malicious code localisation. The rationale is that, while a malware app can disguise itself in some views, disguising in every view while maintaining malicious intent will be much harder. MKLDroid uses a graph kernel to capture structural and contextual information from apps' dependency graphs and identify malice code patterns in each view. Subsequently, it employs Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL) to find a weighted combination of the views which yields the best detection accuracy. Besides multi-view learning, MKLDroid's unique and salient trait is its ability to locate fine-grained malice code portions in dependency graphs (e.g., methods/classes). Through our large-scale experiments on several datasets (incl. wild apps), we demonstrate that MKLDroid outperforms three state-of-the-art techniques consistently, in terms of accuracy while maintaining comparable efficiency. In our malicious code localisation experiments on a dataset of repackaged malware, MKLDroid was able to identify all the malice classes with 94% average recall

What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments

Incentive compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources and its application to GeoPresence-as-a-Service

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen- ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent's exibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo- bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat- isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1 2 -approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent's truthfulness about its exibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798