The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.Comment: 26 page

Nearly optimal solutions for the Chow Parameters Problem and low-weight approximation of halfspaces

The \emph{Chow parameters} of a Boolean function $f: \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$ are its $n+1$ degree-0 and degree-1 Fourier coefficients. It has been known since 1961 (Chow, Tannenbaum) that the (exact values of the) Chow parameters of any linear threshold function $f$ uniquely specify $f$ within the space of all Boolean functions, but until recently (O'Donnell and Servedio) nothing was known about efficient algorithms for \emph{reconstructing} $f$ (exactly or approximately) from exact or approximate values of its Chow parameters. We refer to this reconstruction problem as the \emph{Chow Parameters Problem.} Our main result is a new algorithm for the Chow Parameters Problem which, given (sufficiently accurate approximations to) the Chow parameters of any linear threshold function $f$, runs in time \tilde{O}(n^2)\cdot (1/\eps)^{O(\log^2(1/\eps))} and with high probability outputs a representation of an LTF $f'$ that is \eps-close to $f$. The only previous algorithm (O'Donnell and Servedio) had running time \poly(n) \cdot 2^{2^{\tilde{O}(1/\eps^2)}}. As a byproduct of our approach, we show that for any linear threshold function $f$ over $\{-1,1\}^n$, there is a linear threshold function $f'$ which is \eps-close to $f$ and has all weights that are integers at most \sqrt{n} \cdot (1/\eps)^{O(\log^2(1/\eps))}. This significantly improves the best previous result of Diakonikolas and Servedio which gave a \poly(n) \cdot 2^{\tilde{O}(1/\eps^{2/3})} weight bound, and is close to the known lower bound of $\max\{\sqrt{n},$ (1/\eps)^{\Omega(\log \log (1/\eps))}\} (Goldberg, Servedio). Our techniques also yield improved algorithms for related problems in learning theory

Zero-Convex Functions, Perturbation Resilience, and Subgradient Projections for Feasibility-Seeking Methods

The convex feasibility problem (CFP) is at the core of the modeling of many problems in various areas of science. Subgradient projection methods are important tools for solving the CFP because they enable the use of subgradient calculations instead of orthogonal projections onto the individual sets of the problem. Working in a real Hilbert space, we show that the sequential subgradient projection method is perturbation resilient. By this we mean that under appropriate conditions the sequence generated by the method converges weakly, and sometimes also strongly, to a point in the intersection of the given subsets of the feasibility problem, despite certain perturbations which are allowed in each iterative step. Unlike previous works on solving the convex feasibility problem, the involved functions, which induce the feasibility problem's subsets, need not be convex. Instead, we allow them to belong to a wider and richer class of functions satisfying a weaker condition, that we call "zero-convexity". This class, which is introduced and discussed here, holds a promise to solve optimization problems in various areas, especially in non-smooth and non-convex optimization. The relevance of this study to approximate minimization and to the recent superiorization methodology for constrained optimization is explained.Comment: Mathematical Programming Series A, accepted for publicatio

Hyperplane Separation Technique for Multidimensional Mean-Payoff Games

We consider both finite-state game graphs and recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs), that can model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion, with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives. In pushdown games two types of strategies are relevant: global strategies, that depend on the entire global history; and modular strategies, that have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation. We present solutions to several fundamental algorithmic questions and our main contributions are as follows: (1) We show that finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games can be solved in polynomial time if the number of dimensions and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed; whereas if the number of dimensions is arbitrary, then problem is already known to be coNP-complete. (2) We show that pushdown graphs with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time. (3) For pushdown games under global strategies both single and multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives problems are known to be undecidable, and we show that under modular strategies the multi-dimensional problem is also undecidable (whereas under modular strategies the single dimensional problem is NP-complete). We show that if the number of modules, the number of exits, and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed, then pushdown games under modular strategies with single dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time, and if either of the number of exits or the number of modules is not bounded, then the problem is NP-hard. (4) Finally we show that a fixed parameter tractable algorithm for finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games or pushdown games under modular strategies with single-dimensional mean-payoff objectives would imply the solution of the long-standing open problem of fixed parameter tractability of parity games.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1201.282