Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use

Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus?

There is a growing consensus that emotions contribute positively to human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to the modularity of emotion-generation mechanisms, these arguments are also susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence required to make the pro-emotion position plausible whilst exhibiting key elements of modularity

Gender and the senses of agency

This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little work on how this shaping takes place. In order to provide such an account, I will first look at the minimal and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher 2012), a distinction that draws from work on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). Next I will explain the influence of the narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-formation (Pacherie 2007). After a discussion of the role of gender in the narrative sense of agency, I’ll expand on work by Haslanger (2012) and Young (1980) to offer three ways in which gender influences the minimal sense of agency, showing the effect that gender has on how we perceive our possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner

Collective intelligence for OER sustainability

To thrive, the Open Educational Resource (OER) movement, or a given initiative, must make sense of a complex, changing environment. Since “sustainability” is a desirable systemic capacity that our community should display, we consider a number of principles that sharpen the concept: resilience, sensemaking and complexity. We outline how these motivate the concept of collective intelligence (CI), we give examples of what OER-CI might look like, and we describe the emerging Cohere CI platform we are developing in response to these requirements

Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency

According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position

The role of social interaction in farmers' climate adaptation choice

Adaptation to climate change might not always occur, with potentially\ud catastrophic results. Success depends on coordinated actions at both\ud governmental and individual levels (public and private adaptation). Even for a “wet” country like the Netherlands, climate change projections show that the frequency and severity of droughts are likely to increase. Freshwater is an important factor for agricultural production. A deficit causes damage to crop production and consequently to a loss of income. Adaptation is the key to decrease farmers’ vulnerability at the micro level and the sector’s vulnerability at the macro level. Individual adaptation decision-making is determined by the behavior of economic agents and social interaction among them. This can be best studied with agentbased modelling. Given the uncertainty about future weather conditions and the costs and effectiveness of adaptation strategies, a farmer in the model uses a cognitive process (or heuristic) to make adaptation decisions. In this process, he can rely on his experiences and on information from interactions within his social network. Interaction leads to the spread of information and knowledge that causes learning. Learning changes the conditions for individual adaptation decisionmaking. All these interactions cause emergent phenomena: the diffusion of adaptation strategies and a change of drought vulnerability of the agricultural sector. In this paper, we present a conceptual model and the first implementation of an agent-based model. The aim is to study the role of interaction in a farmer’s social network on adaptation decisions and on the diffusion of adaptation strategies\ud and vulnerability of the agricultural sector. Micro-level survey data will be used to parameterize agents’ behavioral and interaction rules at a later stage. This knowledge is necessary for the successful design of public adaptation strategies, since governmental adaptation actions need to be fine-tuned to private adaptation behavior