What Does '(Non)-Absoluteness of Observed Events' Mean?

Recently there have emerged an assortment of theorems relating to the 'absoluteness of emerged events,' and these results have sometimes been used to argue that quantum mechanics may involve some kind of metaphysically radical non-absoluteness, such as relationalism or perspectivalism. However, in our view a close examination of these theorems fails to convincingly support such possibilities. In this paper we argue that the Wigner's friend paradox, the theorem of Bong et al and the theorem of Lawrence et al are all best understood as demonstrating that if quantum mechanics is universal, and if certain auxiliary assumptions hold, then the world inevitably includes various forms of 'disaccord,' but this need not be interpreted in a metaphysically radical way; meanwhile, the theorem of Ormrod and Barrett is best understood either as an argument for an interpretation allowing multiple outcomes per observer, such as the Everett approach, or as a proof that quantum mechanics cannot be universal in the sense relevant for this theorem. We also argue that these theorems taken together suggest interesting possibilities for a different kind of relational approach in which dynamical states are relativized whilst observed events are absolute, and we show that although something like 'retrocausality' might be needed to make such an approach work, this would be a very special kind of retrocausality which would evade a number of common objections against retrocausality. We conclude that the non-absoluteness theorems may have a significant role to play in helping converge towards an acceptable solution to the measurement problem.Comment: Corrected comments about whether Lawrence et al theorem requires a Locality assumptio

Absoluteness via Resurrection

The resurrection axioms are forcing axioms introduced recently by Hamkins and Johnstone, developing on ideas of Chalons and Velickovi\'c. We introduce a stronger form of resurrection axioms (the \emph{iterated} resurrection axioms $\textrm{RA}_\alpha(\Gamma)$ for a class of forcings $\Gamma$ and a given ordinal $\alpha$), and show that $\textrm{RA}_\omega(\Gamma)$ implies generic absoluteness for the first-order theory of $H_{\gamma^+}$ with respect to forcings in $\Gamma$ preserving the axiom, where $\gamma=\gamma_\Gamma$ is a cardinal which depends on $\Gamma$ ($\gamma_\Gamma=\omega_1$ if $\Gamma$ is any among the classes of countably closed, proper, semiproper, stationary set preserving forcings). We also prove that the consistency strength of these axioms is below that of a Mahlo cardinal for most forcing classes, and below that of a stationary limit of supercompact cardinals for the class of stationary set preserving posets. Moreover we outline that simultaneous generic absoluteness for $H_{\gamma_0^+}$ with respect to $\Gamma_0$ and for $H_{\gamma_1^+}$ with respect to $\Gamma_1$ with $\gamma_0=\gamma_{\Gamma_0}\neq\gamma_{\Gamma_1}=\gamma_1$ is in principle possible, and we present several natural models of the Morse Kelley set theory where this phenomenon occurs (even for all $H_\gamma$ simultaneously). Finally, we compare the iterated resurrection axioms (and the generic absoluteness results we can draw from them) with a variety of other forcing axioms, and also with the generic absoluteness results by Woodin and the second author.Comment: 34 page