Evolution of a supply chain management game for the trading agent competition

TAC SCM is a supply chain management game for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC). The purpose of TAC is to spur high quality research into realistic trading agent problems. We discuss TAC and TAC SCM: game and competition design, scientific impact, and lessons learnt

Evolutionary Optimization of ZIP60: A Controlled Explosion in Hyperspace

The “ZIP” adaptive trading algorithm has been demonstrated to out-perform human traders in experimental studies of continuous double auction (CDA) markets. The original ZIP algorithm requires the values of eight control parameters to be set correctly. A new extension of the ZIP algorithm, called ZIP60, requires the values of 60 parameters to be set correctly. ZIP60 is shown here to produce significantly better results than the original ZIP (called “ZIP8” hereafter), for negligable additional computational costs. A genetic algorithm (GA) is used to search the 60-dimensional ZIP60 parameter space, and it finds parameter vectors that yield ZIP60 traders with mean scores significantly better than those of ZIP8s. This paper shows that the optimizing evolutionary search works best when the GA itself controls the dimensionality of the search-space, so that the search commences in an 8-d space and thereafter the dimensionality of the search-space is gradually increased by the GA until it is exploring a 60-d space. Furthermore, the results from ZIP60 cast some doubt on prior ZIP8 results concerning the evolution of new ‘hybrid’ auction mechanisms that appeared to be better than the CDA

Exploiting simple corporate memory in iterative coalition games

Amongst the challenging problems that must be addressed in order to create increasingly automated electronic commerce systems are those which involve forming coalitions of agents to exploit a particular market opportunity. Furthermore economic systems are normally continuous dynamic systems generating many instances of the same or similar problems (the regular calls for tender, regular emergence of new markets etc.).The work described in this paper explores how simple forms of memory can be exploited by agents over time to guide decision making in iterative sequences of coalition formation problems enabling them to build up social knowledge in order to improve their own utility and the ability of the population to produce increasingly well suited coalitions for a simple call-for-tender economy.Postprint (published version

Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design

Modeling Complex Networks For (Electronic) Commerce

NYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc