Geometric Convergence of Distributed Heavy-Ball Nash Equilibrium Algorithm over Time-Varying Digraphs with Unconstrained Actions

We propose a new distributed algorithm that combines heavy-ball momentum and a consensus-based gradient method to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a class of non-cooperative convex games with unconstrained action sets. In this approach, each agent in the game has access to its own smooth local cost function and can exchange information with its neighbors over a communication network. The proposed method is designed to work on a general sequence of time-varying directed graphs and allows for non-identical step-sizes and momentum parameters. Our work is the first to incorporate heavy-ball momentum in the context of non-cooperative games, and we provide a rigorous proof of its geometric convergence to the NE under the common assumptions of strong convexity and Lipschitz continuity of the agents' cost functions. Moreover, we establish explicit bounds for the step-size values and momentum parameters based on the characteristics of the cost functions, mixing matrices, and graph connectivity structures. To showcase the efficacy of our proposed method, we perform numerical simulations on a Nash-Cournot game to demonstrate its accelerated convergence compared to existing methods

Accelerating Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to solve variational inequalities, we develop the algorithm converging to Nash equilibria in games, where players have no access to the full information but are able to communicate with neighbors over some communication graph. The convergence rate is demonstrated to be geometric and improves the rates obtained by the previously presented procedures seeking Nash equilibria in the class of games under consideration

Nash Equilibrium Seeking in N-Coalition Games via a Gradient-Free Method

This paper studies an $N$-coalition non-cooperative game problem, where the players in the same coalition cooperatively minimize the sum of their local cost functions under a directed communication graph, while collectively acting as a virtual player to play a non-cooperative game with other coalitions. Moreover, it is assumed that the players have no access to the explicit functional form but only the function value of their local costs. To solve the problem, a discrete-time gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, based on the gradient tracking method, is proposed. Specifically, a gradient estimator is developed locally based on Gaussian smoothing to estimate the partial gradients, and a gradient tracker is constructed locally to trace the average sum of the partial gradients among the players within the coalition. With a sufficiently small constant step-size, we show that all players' actions approximately converge to the Nash equilibrium at a geometric rate under a strongly monotone game mapping condition. Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm

Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Limited Cost Function Knowledge via A Consensus-Based Gradient-Free Method

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to estimate other players' actions. To solve the problem, a leader-following consensus gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is proposed. This algorithm utilizes only the measurements of the player's local cost function without the knowledge of its explicit expression or the requirement on its smoothness. Hence, the algorithm is gradient-free during the entire updating process. Moreover, the analysis on the convergence of the Nash equilibrium is studied for the algorithm with both diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, in the case of diminishing step-size, it is shown that the players' actions converge to the Nash equilibrium almost surely, while in the case of fixed step-size, the convergence to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium is achieved. The performance of the proposed algorithm is verified through numerical simulations