Abduction Without Minimality

. In most accounts of common-sense reasoning, only the most preferred among models supplied by the evidence are retained (and the rest eliminated) in order to enhance the inferential prowess. One problem with this strategy is that the agent's working set of models shrinks quickly in the process. We argue that instead of rejecting all the non-best models, the reasoner should reject only the worst models and then examine the consequences of adopting this principle in the context of abductive reasoning. Apart from providing the relevant representation results, we indicate why an iterated account of abduction is feasible in this framework. Keywords: belief revision, common-sense reasoning, philosophical foundations 1 Introduction In many approaches to common-sense reasoning [6], belief change [3] and abductive reasoning [10] appeal is made to the principle of minimal change. This principle can be viewed as the commonsensical principle of selecting the best from the available set..