Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from the Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements

We test whether fund managers have stock-picking skill by comparing their holdings and trades prior to earnings announcements with the returns realized at those events. This approach largely avoids the joint-hypothesis problem with long-horizon studies of fund performance. Consistent with skilled trading, we find that, on average, stocks that funds buy earn significantly higher returns at subsequent earnings announcements than stocks that they sell. Funds display persistence in our event return-based metrics, and those that do well tend to have a growth objective, large size, high turnover, and use incentive fees to motivate managers.

Gender and Job Performance: Evidence from Wall Street

We study the relation between gender and job performance among brokerage firm equity analysts. Women's representation in analyst positions drops from 16% in 1995 to 13% in 2005. We find women cover roughly 9 stocks on average compared to 10 for men. Women's earnings estimates tend to be less accurate. After controlling for forecast characteristics, the difference in accuracy is roughly equivalent to four years of experience. Despite reduced coverage and lower forecast accuracy, we find women are significantly more likely to be designated as All-Stars, which suggests they outperform at other aspects of the job such as client service.

To Trade or Not to Trade: The Strategic Trading of Insiders around News Announcements

We argue that insiders' decisions to trade in short windows before news announcements are likely to result from a trade-off between the incentives to capitalize on the foreknowledge of the disclosure and the risk of regulatory scrutiny and lost reputation. We provide evidence that insider buying is driven by the trade-off, while selling is primarily influenced by the deterring effect of the regulatory and reputation risks. We show that insiders strategically choose the amount of shares bought ahead of good news announcements. They increase their purchases as the price impact of the news goes up, but we find that the amount of shares purchased levels off as the news becomes extreme. In contrast, we find that the probability of insider selling significantly decreases with the price impact of the forthcoming bad news. To further support our arguments on the importance of incentives and disincentives to trade, we show that the strategic trading is mainly observed in the most price-sensitive groups of news announcements, it is clearly pronounced for best informed executives (CEOs), and that trading patterns change with changes in regulations, and insiders with higher reputation at risk limit their trading ahead of bad news.insider trading, private information, information disclosure, regulation

Newsletter / House of Finance, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt 4/10

Credit Rating Announcements – The Impact of the Agency’s Reason, Public Information, and M&A ; Toward a New European Financial Architecture in the Rating Sector – an Economic Analysis and Legal Solutions ; Where Finance Meets Macro ; Clear Enforcement rules for the Stability and Growth Pac

When Managers Bypass Shareholder Approval of Board Appointments: Evidence from the Private Security Market

This paper investigates the influence of managerial entrenchment on private placements by examining the firm\u27s decision to appoint representatives of the private investors to the board without shareholder approval. By analyzing a sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with private offerings between 1995 and 2000, we find that firms with greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass shareholder approval. Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint independent directors or to elect one of these directors as chairman. We also show that the market reacts more positively to the private offering announcement when the firm submits its board candidates for shareholder approval. Further, firms that bypass approval underperform compared to firms that obtain it. Overall our findings suggest that managers avoid shareholder approval to perpetuate entrenchment

Do macroeconomic announcements move inflation forecasts?

This paper presents an empirical strategy that bridges the gap between event studies and macroeconomic forecasts based on common-factor models. Event studies examine the response of financial variables to a market-sensitive "surprise" component using a narrow event window. The authors argue that these features - narrow event window and surprise component - can be easily embedded in common-factor models that study the real-time impact of macroeconomic announcements on key policy variables such as inflation or gross domestic product growth. Demonstrative applications are provided for Swiss inflation that show that (i) the communication of monetary policy announcements generates an asymmetric response for inflation forecasts, (ii) the pass-through effect of import price releases on inflation forecasts is weak, and (iii) macroeconomic releases of real and nominal variables generate nonsynchronized effects for inflation forecasts.Inflation (Finance) ; Forecasting