He tokotoko mo nga tangata : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Regional and Environmental Planning at Massey University

THE PROBLEM Urban river corridor areas are often subject to damaging use and to increasing pressure from conflicting uses. The main issue is the need to utilise the characteristics of a river and its margins within a city while integrating it into the city's life and preserving its ecological functions. The aim of the thesis is to develop a planning framework to address this issue. Information from various disciplines contribute to the River Corridor Planning Framework. The main areas researched are landscape aesthetics, ecology, recreation styles and public participation in planning. The study of landscape aesthetics reveals universally valued natural landscape features, and in part justifies concern for, and planning action in, river margin areas. The potential for river corridor areas to host significant ecological functions is shown in the ecological study, and brings an additional aspect to the urban planning situation. The significance of provision for informal recreation, the most common type, also influences the Planning Framework. Integral to the Planning Framework is a strong belief in, and justification of, the need to include public participation in all phases of the planning process. The River Corridor Planning Framework developed is applied to part of the Whanganui River in the city of Wanganui, which is in some ways typical of medium sized cities with rivers in New Zealand. It is suggested that the River Corridor Planning Framework may have application in other cities with similar situations

Weighing the Aim of Belief Again

In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is capable of being weighed against other aims. Recently, however, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof have objected to this response on the grounds that it employs an undefended conception of the aim of belief not shared by Owens, and that it equivocates between importantly different contexts of doxastic deliberation. In this note, I argue that both of these objections fail

Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief

In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to it from Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen which appeals to weak truth regulation as a feature common to all belief. We argue that beliefs from fiction indicate that there is not a basic level of truth regulation common to all beliefs, and thus the teleologist’s dilemma remains. We consider two objections to our argument. First, that the attitudes gained through reading fiction are not beliefs, and thus teleologists are not required to account for them in their theory. We respond to this concern by defending a doxastic account of the attitudes gained from fiction. Second, that these beliefs are in fact appropriately truth-aimed, insofar as readers form beliefs upon what they take to be author testimony. We respond to this concern by suggesting that the conditions under which one can form justified beliefs upon testimony are not met in the cases we discuss. Lastly, we gesture towards a teleological account grounded in biological function, which is not vulnerable to our argument. We conclude that beliefs from fiction present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief

Does belief have an aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense