A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for Mobile Sponsored Content and Service Markets

In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers are able to subsidize their target mobile users through directly paying the mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged by the network operator to the mobile users. The sponsoring mechanism leads to a surge in mobile data and service demand, which in return compensates for the sponsoring cost and benefits the content/service providers. In this paper, we study the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the mobile users, the content/service providers and the network operator, as a two-level game with multiple Stackelberg (i.e., leader) players. Our study is featured by the consideration of global network effects owning to consumers' grouping. Since the mobile users may have bounded rationality, we model the service-selection process among them as an evolutionary-population follower sub-game. Meanwhile, we model the pricing-then-sponsoring process between the content/service providers and the network operator as a non-cooperative equilibrium searching problem. By investigating the structure of the proposed game, we reveal a few important properties regarding the equilibrium existence, and propose a distributed, projection-based algorithm for iterative equilibrium searching. Simulation results validate the convergence of the proposed algorithm, and demonstrate how sponsoring helps improve both the providers' profits and the users' experience

Analyzing coalitions in wireless heterogeneous networks and their economic aspects

The massive investment that is essential to implement a large area wireless network is one of the significant roadblocks that stops service providers from offering more affordable data services. The fact that the fast evolution of wireless technologies requires frequent updates of hardware and software also leads to higher capital expenditure and operation costs for the providers and subsequently to more expensive data plans for the end users. The implementation of suboptimal pricing schemes in today’s wireless market, which does not consider service level agreements and forces users to pay for both network connectivity and data transfer, is another reason to decrease the overall satisfaction of subscribers. In view of these issues our objective in this thesis is to study the proper pricing methods based on the reality of current market as well as to consider alternative options that can reduce the service costs of wireless providers are our objectives. We study the volume-based pricing which is the dominant method in cellular networks nowadays. We derive the optimal data plan parameters such as the data volume cap, price, and data rate. Considering the cost-reduction possibilities, we prove that a coalition of providers in which they can serve users of each other is a valid alternative that reduces the implementation costs of network expansion. We build our analysis based on the cooperation between heterogeneous providers and we consider the heterogeneity in both technology and service aspects. We avoid the models which consider a coalition of all providers since it forms a monopoly and is prohibited by regulatory entities. Hence, we study models of coalitional structures that include several sets of providers. In this way, users have the option to select their data plan based on the service offered by a coalitional set of providers that can have different technologies in their access network. Concerning the service-oriented heterogeneous networks, we track the directions of payments from the content providers (CP) to the service providers (SP) and finally to the end users and try to modify it based on social fairness. To do so, we analyze several content types based on subscriber usage patterns and we find the ones that can be offered with a different pricing method without causing profit loss to CP or SP. Our goal is to set a coalitional framework between CP and SP that can lead to a free unlimited access to particular content types. We show that such agreements, if set correctly, can increase the profit of CP and SP. Throughout this thesis, the analytical models are verified with numerical examples that are designed to simulate the real world scenarios