Routing of railway carriages: A case study

In the context of organizing timetables for railway companies the following railway carriage routing problem occurs. Given a timetable containing rail links with departure and destination times/stations and the composition of the trains, find a routing of railway carriages such that the required carriages are always available when a train departs. We will present a local search approach for this routing problem for the railway carriages. The approach uses structural properties of an integer multi-commodity network flow formulation of the problem. Computational results for a real world instance are given

Operations research in passenger railway transportation

In this paper, we give an overview of state-of-the-art OperationsResearch models and techniques used in passenger railwaytransportation. For each planning phase (strategic, tactical andoperational), we describe the planning problems arising there anddiscuss some models and algorithms to solve them. We do not onlyconsider classical, well-known topics such as timetabling, rollingstock scheduling and crew scheduling, but we also discuss somerecently developed topics as shunting and reliability oftimetables.Finally, we focus on several practical aspects for each of theseproblems at the largest Dutch railway operator, NS Reizigers.passenger railway transportation;operation research;planning problems

What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments

Incentive compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources and its application to GeoPresence-as-a-Service

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen- ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent's exibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo- bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat- isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1 2 -approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent's truthfulness about its exibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

On green routing and scheduling problem

The vehicle routing and scheduling problem has been studied with much interest within the last four decades. In this paper, some of the existing literature dealing with routing and scheduling problems with environmental issues is reviewed, and a description is provided of the problems that have been investigated and how they are treated using combinatorial optimization tools

Comparison of heuristic approaches for the multiple depot vehicle scheduling problem

Given a set of timetabled tasks, the multi-depot vehicle scheduling problemis a well-known problem that consists of determining least-cost schedulesfor vehicles assigned to several depots such that each task is accomplishedexactly once by a vehicle. In this paper, we propose to compare theperformance of five different heuristic approaches for this problem,namely, a heuristic \\mip solver, a Lagrangian heuristic, a columngeneration heuristic, a large neighborhood search heuristic using columngeneration for neighborhood evaluation, and a tabu search heuristic. Thefirst three methods are adaptations of existing methods, while the last twoare novel approaches for this problem. Computational results on randomlygenerated instances show that the column generation heuristic performs thebest when enough computational time is available and stability is required,while the large neighborhood search method is the best alternative whenlooking for a compromise between computational time and solution quality.tabu search;column generation;vehicle scheduling;heuristics;Lagrangian heuristic;large neighborhood search;multiple depot