Modern and Lightweight Component-based Symmetric Cipher Algorithms: A Review

Information security, being one of the corner stones of network and communication technology, has been evolving tremendously to cope with the parallel evolution of network security threats. Hence, cipher algorithms in the core of the information security process have more crucial role to play here, with continuous need for new and unorthodox designs to meet the increasing complexity of the applications environment that keep offering challenges to the current existing cipher algorithms. The aim of this review is to present symmetric cipher main components, the modern and lightweight symmetric cipher algorithms design based on the components that utilized in cipher design, highlighting the effect of each component and the essential component among them, how the modern cipher has modified to lightweight cipher by reducing the number and size of these components, clarify how these components give the strength for symmetric cipher versus asymmetric of cipher. Moreover, a new classification of cryptography algorithms to four categories based on four factors is presented. Finally, some modern and lightweight symmetric cipher algorithms are selected, presented with a comparison between them according to their components by taking into considerations the components impact on security, performance, and resource requirements

A Survey of Lightweight Cryptosystems for Smart Home Devices

A Smart Home uses interconnected network technology to monitor the environment, control the various physical appliances, and communicate with each other in a close environment. A typical smart home is made up of a security system, intercommunication system, lighting system, and ventilation system.  Data security schemes for smart homes are ineffective due to inefficiency cryptosystems, high energy consumption, and low exchange security. Traditional cryptosystems are less-applicable because of their large block size, large key size, and complex rounds. This paper conducts a review of smart homes, and adopts Ultra-Sooner Lightweight Cryptography to secure home door. It provides extensive background of cryptography, forms of cryptography as associated issues and strengths, current trends, smart home door system design, and future works suggestions. Specifically, there are prospects of utilizing XORed lightweight cryptosystem for developing encryption and decryption algorithms in smart home devices. The Substitution Permutation Network, and Feistel Network cryptographic primitives were most advanced forms of cipher operations with security guarantees. Therefore, better security, memory and energy efficiency can be obtained with lightweight ciphers in smart home devices when compared to existing solutions. In the subsequent studies, a blockchain-based lightweight cryptography can be the next springboard in attaining the most advanced security for smart home systems and their appliances.     &nbsp

Residual Vulnerabilities to Power side channel attacks of lightweight ciphers cryptography competition Finalists

The protection of communications between Internet of Things (IoT) devices is of great concern because the information exchanged contains vital sensitive data. Malicious agents seek to exploit those data to extract secret information about the owners or the system. Power side channel attacks are of great concern on these devices because their power consumption unintentionally leaks information correlatable to the device\u27s secret data. Several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of authenticated encryption with advanced data, in protecting communications with these devices. A comprehensive evaluation of the seven (out of 10) algorithm finalists of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) IoT lightweight cipher competition that do not integrate built‐in countermeasures is proposed. The study shows that, nonetheless, they still present some residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks (SCA). For five ciphers, an attack methodology as well as the leakage function needed to perform correlation power analysis (CPA) is proposed. The authors assert that Ascon, Sparkle, and PHOTON‐Beetle security vulnerability can generally be assessed with the security assumptions “Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only, with nonce‐misuse resilience adversary (CCAmL1)” and “Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only with nonce‐respecting adversary (CCAL1)”, respectively. However, the security vulnerability of GIFT‐COFB, Grain, Romulus, and TinyJambu can be evaluated more straightforwardly with publicly available leakage models and solvers. They can also be assessed simply by increasing the number of traces collected to launch the attack