8,570 research outputs found

    Agent‐based modeling of malware dynamics in heterogeneous environments

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    The increasing convergence of power‐law networks such as social networking and peer‐to‐peer applications, web‐delivered applications, and mobile platforms makes today's users highly vulnerable to entirely new generations of malware that exploit vulnerabilities in web applications and mobile platforms for new infections, while using the power‐law connectivity for finding new victims. The traditional epidemic models based on assumptions of homogeneity, average‐degree distributions, and perfect‐mixing are inadequate to model this type of malware propagation. In this paper, we study four aspects crucial to modeling malware propagation: application‐level interactions among users of such networks , local network structure , user mobility , and network coordination of malware such as botnets . Since closed‐form solutions of malware propagation considering these aspects are difficult to obtain, we describe an open‐source, flexible agent‐based emulation framework that can be used by malware researchers for studying today's complex malware. The framework, called Agent‐Based Malware Modeling (AMM), allows different applications, network structure, network coordination, and user mobility in either a geographic or a logical domain to study various infection and propagation scenarios. In addition to traditional worms and viruses, the framework also allows modeling network coordination of malware such as botnets. The majority of the parameters used in the framework can be derived from real‐life network traces collected from a network, and therefore, represent realistic malware propagation and infection scenarios. As representative examples, we examine two well‐known malware spreading mechanisms: (i) a malicious virus such as Cabir spreading among the subscribers of a cellular network using Bluetooth and (ii) a hybrid worm that exploit email and file‐sharing to infect users of a social network. In both cases, we identify the parameters most important to the spread of the epidemic based upon our extensive simulation results. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This paper presents a novel agent‐based framework for realistic modeling of malware propagation in heterogeneous networks, applications and platforms. The majority of the parameters used in the framework can be derived from real‐life network traces collected from a network, and therefore, represent realistic malware propagation and infection scenarios for the given network. Two well‐known malware spreading mechanisms in traditional as well as mobile environments were studied using extensive simulations within the framework and the most important spreading parameters were identified.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101832/1/sec298.pd

    OnionBots: Subverting Privacy Infrastructure for Cyber Attacks

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    Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets, ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets. OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement, OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

    Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences

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    In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks, highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control (C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages. Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor

    Storytelling Security: User-Intention Based Traffic Sanitization

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    Malicious software (malware) with decentralized communication infrastructure, such as peer-to-peer botnets, is difficult to detect. In this paper, we describe a traffic-sanitization method for identifying malware-triggered outbound connections from a personal computer. Our solution correlates user activities with the content of outbound traffic. Our key observation is that user-initiated outbound traffic typically has corresponding human inputs, i.e., keystroke or mouse clicks. Our analysis on the causal relations between user inputs and packet payload enables the efficient enforcement of the inter-packet dependency at the application level. We formalize our approach within the framework of protocol-state machine. We define new application-level traffic-sanitization policies that enforce the inter-packet dependencies. The dependency is derived from the transitions among protocol states that involve both user actions and network events. We refer to our methodology as storytelling security. We demonstrate a concrete realization of our methodology in the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing application, describe its use in blocking traffic of P2P bots on a host. We implement and evaluate our prototype in Windows operating system in both online and offline deployment settings. Our experimental evaluation along with case studies of real-world P2P applications demonstrates the feasibility of verifying the inter-packet dependencies. Our deep packet inspection incurs overhead on the outbound network flow. Our solution can also be used as an offline collect-and-analyze tool
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