A Robust Reachability Review for Control System Security

Control systems underpin the core technology in numerous critical infrastructure systems; e.g. the electricity, transportation and many defence systems. Increasingly, such systems are becoming the target of a novel type of deliberate cyber-attack. The notion of control system security is a modern idea concerned with the analysis, design and application of tools that ensure the operational goals of a particular control systems are protected from deliberate, malicious, electronic attack. The aim of this field is to reduce the likelihood of success, and the severity of impact, of a cyber-attack against control systems operating within critical infrastructure. This contribution reexamines a classical notion of control reachability through set-theoretic arguments with an additional, modern, emphasis on control system security. In particular, the reachability idea is extended to a compromised control system architecture. Classical and novel results on reachability are defined within this setting from the point-of-view of an attacker and, conversely, a system designer wanting to secure the system. The idea of reachability studied in this setting for secure control is important in both the design of robust control systems with security features and in assessing the vulnerability of particular control systems

A robust reachability review for control system security

Control systems underpin the core technology in numerous critical infrastructure systems; e.g. the electricity, transportation and many defence systems. Increasingly, such systems are becoming the target of a novel type of deliberate cyber-attack. The notion of control system security is a modern idea concerned with the analysis, design and application of tools that ensure the operational goals of a particular control systems are protected from deliberate, malicious, electronic attack. The aim of this field is to reduce the likelihood of success, and the severity of impact, of a cyber-attack against control systems operating within critical infrastructure. This contribution reexamines a classical notion of control reachability through set-theoretic arguments with an additional, modern, emphasis on control system security. In particular, the reachability idea is extended to a compromised control system architecture. Classical and novel results on reachability are defined within this setting from the point-of-view of an attacker and, conversely, a system designer wanting to secure the system. The idea of reachability studied in this setting for secure control is important in both the design of robust control systems with security features and in assessing the vulnerability of particular control systems. © 2011 ENGINEERS AUSTRALIA & AUSTRALIAN OPTICAL