3 research outputs found
Spieltheoretische Ăśberlegungen zum digitalen Journalismus
Dieser Beitrag verknüpft Theorien und Konzepte der Organisationsforschung und wendet sie zur Erklärung des Entstehens des redaktionellen Angebots von Nachrichtenorganisationen im digitalen Kontext an. Der Beitrag konzipiert Nachrichtenorganisationen als hybride Organisationen, die sich widersprüchlichen institutionellen Logiken verschrieben haben. Dabei lösen manche Entscheidungen - wie das Posten von Nachrichten im Clickbait-Stil - ein Dilemma zwischen publizistischen Normen und ökonomischen Zielen aus, das zunächst innerhalb der Organisation ausgehandelt werden muss. Werden kommerzielle Logiken vor dem Hintergrund von Kurationsalgorithmen sozialer Plattformen priorisiert, nutzen auch traditionelle Nachrichtenmedien Clickbait-Überschriften und weichen damit von professionellen Normen ab. Spieltheoretische Ansätze beschreiben, mittels welcher Spielstrategien Nachrichtenmedien abweichende Inhalte auf digitalen Plattformen anbieten.This article links theories and concepts of organizational research and applies them to explain the emergence of editorial supply of news organizations in the digital context. The article conceives news organizations as hybrid organizations that are committed to contradictory institutional logics. Some decisions - such as the posting of clickbait-style news - trigger a dilemma between journalistic norms and economic goals that must first be negotiated within the organization. If commercial logics are prioritized against the background of curation algorithms of social platforms, traditional news media also use clickbait headlines and thus deviate from professional norms. Game theoretical approaches describe the game strategies by which news media supply deviating content on digital platforms
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Strategic Exploration: Preemption and Prioritization
This paper provides a model of strategic exploration in which two competing players simultaneously explore a set of alternatives over time to study search dynamics, payoff divisions, and distributions of discovery time. The strategic tension is between preemption, i.e., the incentive to covertly explore alternatives that the opponent will explore in future, and prioritization, i.e., the incentive to explore alternatives with the highest success probabilities. We show that players randomize over the same set of alternatives that expands over time, duplicating each other’s explorations from start to finish. When players are symmetric in their speed of exploration, equilibrium strategies are greedy. In the asymmetric case, the weak player’s strategy is greedy, but the strong player randomizes over alternatives with different posteriors and captures a share of payoff disproportionately larger than his share of exploration capacity. The weak player conducts extensive instead of intensive exploration, i.e., he covers as many alternatives as the strong player does but never explores any alternative with cumulative probability one. The overall discovery time decreases in asymmetry in the first-order stochastic dominance sense