31,931 research outputs found
The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each set in a collection of choice sets. We examine the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability. Pareto rationalizability requires that we can endow each individual in the coalition with a preference relation such that the observed choices are Pareto efficient. We differentiate between the situation where the choice function is considered to select all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set and the situation where it only contains one or several Pareto optimal alternatives. In the former case we find that Pareto rationalizability is an NP-complete problem. For the latter case we demonstrate that, if we have no additional information on the individual preference relations, then all choice behavior is Pareto rationalizable. However, if we have such additional information, then Pareto rationalizability is again NP-complete. Our results are valid for any coalition of size greater or equal than two.
The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior.
We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each set in a collection of choice sets. We examine the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability. Pareto rationalizability requires that we can endow each individual in the coalition with a preference relation such that the observed choices are Pareto efficient. We differentiate between the situation where the choice function is considered to select all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set and the situation where it only contains one or several Pareto optimal alternatives. In the former case we find that Pareto rationalizability is an NP-complete problem. For the latter case we demonstrate that, if we have no additional information on the individual preference relations, then all choice behavior is Pareto rationalizable. However, if we have such additional information, then Pareto rationalizability is again NP-complete. Our results are valid for any coalition of size greater or equal than two.
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences
A recent line of work, starting with Beigman and Vohra (2006) and
Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012), has addressed the problem of {\em learning} a
utility function from revealed preference data. The goal here is to make use of
past data describing the purchases of a utility maximizing agent when faced
with certain prices and budget constraints in order to produce a hypothesis
function that can accurately forecast the {\em future} behavior of the agent.
In this work we advance this line of work by providing sample complexity
guarantees and efficient algorithms for a number of important classes. By
drawing a connection to recent advances in multi-class learning, we provide a
computationally efficient algorithm with tight sample complexity guarantees
( for the case of goods) for learning linear utility
functions under a linear price model. This solves an open question in
Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012). Our technique yields numerous generalizations
including the ability to learn other well-studied classes of utility functions,
to deal with a misspecified model, and with non-linear prices
On the complexity of rationalizing behavior
We study the complexity of rationalizing choice behavior. We do so by analyzing two polar cases, and a number of intermediate ones. In our most structured case, that is where choice behavior is defined in universal choice domains and satisfies the "weak axiom of revealed preference," finding the complete preorder rationalizing choice behavior is a simple matter. In the polar case, where no restriction whatsoever is imposed, either on choice behavior or on choice domain, finding the complete preorders that rationalize behavior turns out to be intractable. We show that the task of finding the rationalizing complete preorders is equivalent to a graph problem. This allows the search for existing algorithms in the graph theory literature, for the rationalization of choice.Rationalization, Computational complexity, NP-complete, Arbitrary Choice Domains
Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data: Demographics and Heterogeneity
In this paper, we introduce a new measure of how close a set of choices are to satisfying the observable implications of rational choice, and apply it to a large balanced panel of household level consumption data. We use this method to answer three related questions: (i) "How close are individual consumption choices to satisfying the model of utility maximization?" (ii) "Are there di¤erences in rationality between di¤erent demographic groups?" (iii) "Can choices be aggregated across individuals under the assumption of homogeneous preferences?" Crucially, in answering these questions, we take into account the power of budget sets faced by each household to expose failures of rationality. To summarize our results we ?nd that: (i) while observed violations of rationality are small in absolute terms, our households are only moderately more rational than the benchmark of random choice; (ii) there are signi?cant di¤erences in the rationality of di¤erent groups, with multi-head households more rational than single head households, and the youngest households more rational than middle age households; (iii) the assumption of homogenous preferences is strongly rejected: choice data that is aggregated across households exhibits high levels of irrationality.#
Mainstream economics and the Austrian school: toward reunification
In this paper, I compare the methodology of the Austrian school to two alternative methodologies from the economic mainstream: the ‘orthodox’ and revealed preference methodologies. I argue that Austrian school theorists should stop describing themselves as ‘extreme apriorists’ (or writing suggestively to that effect), and should start giving greater acknowledgement to the importance of empirical work within their research program. The motivation for this dialectical shift is threefold: the approach is more faithful to their actual practices, it better illustrates the underlying similarities between the mainstream and Austrian research paradigms, and it provides a philosophical
foundation that is much more plausible in itself
Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference
In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning
perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown
distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to
some unknown utility function, subject to the given prices and budget
constraint. We wish not only to find a utility function which rationalizes a
finite set of observations, but to produce a hypothesis valuation function
which accurately predicts the behavior of the agent in the future. We give
efficient algorithms with polynomial sample-complexity for agents with linear
valuation functions, as well as for agents with linearly separable, concave
valuation functions with bounded second derivative.Comment: Extended abstract appears in WINE 201
Nonparametric Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: An Integer Programming Procedure
We present an IP-based nonparametric (revealed preference) testing proce- dure for rational consumption behavior in terms of general collective models, which include consumption externalities and public consumption. An empiri- cal application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the practical usefulness of the procedure. Finally, we present extensions of the testing procedure to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the collective model subject to testing, and to quantify and improve the power of the corresponding collective rationality tests.collective consumption model;revealed preferences;nonparametric rationality tests;integer programming (IP)
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