Tameness in least fixed-point logic and McColm's conjecture

We investigate four model-theoretic tameness properties in the context of least fixed-point logic over a family of finite structures. We find that each of these properties depends only on the elementary (i.e., first-order) limit theory, and we completely determine the valid entailments among them. In contrast to the context of first-order logic on arbitrary structures, the order property and independence property are equivalent in this setting. McColm conjectured that least fixed-point definability collapses to first-order definability exactly when proficiency fails. McColm's conjecture is known to be false in general. However, we show that McColm's conjecture is true for any family of finite structures whose limit theory is model-theoretically tame

Influence tests I: ideal composite hypothesis tests, and causal semimeasures

Ratios of universal enumerable semimeasures corresponding to hypotheses are investigated as a solution for statistical composite hypotheses testing if an unbounded amount of computation time can be assumed. Influence testing for discrete time series is defined using generalized structural equations. Several ideal tests are introduced, and it is argued that when Halting information is transmitted, in some cases, instantaneous cause and consequence can be inferred where this is not possible classically. The approach is contrasted with Bayesian definitions of influence, where it is left open whether all Bayesian causal associations of universal semimeasures are equal within a constant. Finally the approach is also contrasted with existing engineering procedures for influence and theoretical definitions of causation.Comment: 29 pages, 3 figures, draf

Arrovian juntas

This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the classification of all such voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we leave the traditional realm of complete orderings, the picture changes. Here we consider the more general setting where alternatives may be incomparable, that is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy or coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description of all such voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results.Comment: 22 pages, 1 figur