Stability of Fluid Queuing Systems with Parallel Servers and Stochastic Capacities

This note introduces a piecewise-deterministic queueing (PDQ) model to study the stability of traffic queues in parallel-link transportation systems facing stochastic capacity fluctuations. The saturation rate (capacity) of the PDQ model switches between a finite set of modes according to a Markov chain, and link inflows are controlled by a state-feedback policy. A PDQ system is stable only if a lower bound on the time-average link inflows does not exceed the corresponding time-average saturation rate. Furthermore, a PDQ system is stable if the following two conditions hold: the nominal mode's saturation rate is high enough that all queues vanish in this mode, and a bilinear matrix inequality (BMI) involving an underestimate of the discharge rates of the PDQ in individual modes is feasible. The stability conditions can be strengthened for two-mode PDQs. These results can be used for design of routing policies that guarantee stability of traffic queues under stochastic capacity fluctuations.Comment: 20 pages, 3 figure

Effects of Information Heterogeneity in Bayesian Routing Games

This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian congestion game, in which players have private information about incidents, and each player chooses her route on a network of parallel links. The links are prone to incidents that occur with an ex-ante known probability. The demand is comprised of two player populations: one with access to high accuracy incident information and another with low accuracy information, i.e. the populations differ only by their access to information. The common knowledge includes: (i) the demand and route cost functions, (ii) the fraction of highly-informed players, (iii) the incident probability, and (iv) the marginal type distributions induced by the information structure of the game. We present a full characterization of the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium of this game under the assumption that low information players receive no additional information beyond common knowledge. We also compute the cost to individual players and the social cost as a function of the fraction of highly-informed players when they receive perfectly accurate information. Our first result suggests that below a certain threshold of highly-informed players, both populations experience a reduction in individual cost, with the highly-informed players receiving a greater reduction. However, above this threshold, both populations realize the same equilibrium cost. Secondly, there exists another (lower or equal) threshold above which a further increase in the fraction of highly-informed players does not reduce the expected social costs. Thus, once a sufficiently large number of players are highly informed, wider distribution of more accurate information is ineffective at best, and otherwise socially harmful