Resilient Control under Denial-of-Service Attacks

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have attracted much attention due to the advances in automation. By integrating communication and computation technologies, CPSs have a broad spectrum of applications ranging from the control of small local systems to the control of large-scale systems, some of which are safety-critical. This raises the issue of reliability of CPSs to a considerably important level. Among a variety of aspects in reliability problems, the security of CPSs becomes a challenge from both practical and theoretical points of view. This thesis investigates the stabilization problem of networked control systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Intuitively, implementing predictor-based controllers can compensate for the data loss due to DoS attacks by estimating the lost signals, and hence the resilience of control systems can be improved. Following this idea, we have developed the resilient controllers by exploiting the recent results in finite-time observers. It is interesting to see that the resilience of the networked control systems depends on the prediction accuracy and horizon. Besides this, the thesis also investigates the stabilization problem of distributed systems under DoS attacks