A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

A Low-Complexity Approach to Distributed Cooperative Caching with Geographic Constraints

We consider caching in cellular networks in which each base station is equipped with a cache that can store a limited number of files. The popularity of the files is known and the goal is to place files in the caches such that the probability that a user at an arbitrary location in the plane will find the file that she requires in one of the covering caches is maximized. We develop distributed asynchronous algorithms for deciding which contents to store in which cache. Such cooperative algorithms require communication only between caches with overlapping coverage areas and can operate in asynchronous manner. The development of the algorithms is principally based on an observation that the problem can be viewed as a potential game. Our basic algorithm is derived from the best response dynamics. We demonstrate that the complexity of each best response step is independent of the number of files, linear in the cache capacity and linear in the maximum number of base stations that cover a certain area. Then, we show that the overall algorithm complexity for a discrete cache placement is polynomial in both network size and catalog size. In practical examples, the algorithm converges in just a few iterations. Also, in most cases of interest, the basic algorithm finds the best Nash equilibrium corresponding to the global optimum. We provide two extensions of our basic algorithm based on stochastic and deterministic simulated annealing which find the global optimum. Finally, we demonstrate the hit probability evolution on real and synthetic networks numerically and show that our distributed caching algorithm performs significantly better than storing the most popular content, probabilistic content placement policy and Multi-LRU caching policies.Comment: 24 pages, 9 figures, presented at SIGMETRICS'1