A case for adaptive sub-carrier level power allocation in OFDMA networks

In today's OFDMA networks, the transmission power is typically fixed and the same for all the sub-carriers that compose a channel. The sub-carriers though, experience different degrees of fading and thus, the received power is different for different sub-carriers; while some frequencies experience deep fades, others are relatively unaffected. In this paper, we make a case of redistributing the power across the sub-carriers (subject to a fixed power budget constraint) to better cope with this frequency selectivity. Specifically, we design a joint power and rate adaptation scheme (called JPRA for short) wherein power redistribution is combined with sub-carrier level rate adaptation to yield significant throughput benefits. We further consider two variants of JPRA: (a) JPRA-CR where, the power is redistributed across sub-carriers so as to support a maximum common rate (CR) across sub-carriers and (b) JPRA-MT where, the goal is to redistribute power such that the transmission time of a packet is minimized. While the first variant decreases transceiver complexity and is simpler, the second is geared towards achieving the maximum throughput possible. We implement both variants of JPRA on our WARP radio testbed. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that our scheme provides a 35% improvement in total network throughput in testbed experiments compared to FARA, a scheme where only sub-carrier level rate adaptation is used. We also perform simulations to demonstrate the efficacy of JPRA in larger scale networks. © 2012 ACM

A Heuristic Algorithm for Resource Allocation/Reallocation Problem

This paper presents a 1-opt heuristic approach to solve resource allocation/reallocation problem which is known as 0/1 multichoice multidimensional knapsack problem (MMKP). The intercept matrix of the constraints is employed to find optimal or near-optimal solution of the MMKP. This heuristic approach is tested for 33 benchmark problems taken from OR library of sizes upto 7000, and the results have been compared with optimum solutions. Computational complexity is proved to be (2) of solving heuristically MMKP using this approach. The performance of our heuristic is compared with the best state-of-art heuristic algorithms with respect to the quality of the solutions found. The encouraging results especially for relatively large-size test problems indicate that this heuristic approach can successfully be used for finding good solutions for highly constrained NP-hard problems

The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential mechanism from differential privacy

Packing Privacy Budget Efficiently

Machine learning (ML) models can leak information about users, and differential privacy (DP) provides a rigorous way to bound that leakage under a given budget. This DP budget can be regarded as a new type of compute resource in workloads of multiple ML models training on user data. Once it is used, the DP budget is forever consumed. Therefore, it is crucial to allocate it most efficiently to train as many models as possible. This paper presents the scheduler for privacy that optimizes for efficiency. We formulate privacy scheduling as a new type of multidimensional knapsack problem, called privacy knapsack, which maximizes DP budget efficiency. We show that privacy knapsack is NP-hard, hence practical algorithms are necessarily approximate. We develop an approximation algorithm for privacy knapsack, DPK, and evaluate it on microbenchmarks and on a new, synthetic private-ML workload we developed from the Alibaba ML cluster trace. We show that DPK: (1) often approaches the efficiency-optimal schedule, (2) consistently schedules more tasks compared to a state-of-the-art privacy scheduling algorithm that focused on fairness (1.3-1.7x in Alibaba, 1.0-2.6x in microbenchmarks), but (3) sacrifices some level of fairness for efficiency. Therefore, using DPK, DP ML operators should be able to train more models on the same amount of user data while offering the same privacy guarantee to their users

Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated type space for each bidder. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism is a O(1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the type space of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard hazard rate condition. We further show a logarithmic approximation when the hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by showing that achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and one bidder, requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing generic rounding schemes from first principles. We believe this approach will be useful in other Bayesian mechanism design contexts.Comment: Final version accepted to STOC '10. Incorporates significant reviewer comment