Correlation, price discovery and co-movement of ABS and equity

Asset-backed securitization (ABS) has become a viable and increasingly attractive risk management and refinancing method either as a standalone form of structured finance or as securitized debt in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). However, the absence of industry standardization has prevented rising investment demand from translating into market liquidity comparable to traditional fixed income instruments, in all but a few selected market segments. Particularly low financial transparency and complex security designs inhibits profound analysis of secondary market pricing and how it relates to established forms of external finance. This paper represents the first attempt to measure the intertemporal, bivariate causal relationship between matched price series of equity and ABS issued by the same entity. In a two-dimensional linear system of simultaneous equations we investigate the short-term dynamics and long-term consistency of daily secondary market data from the U.K. Sterling ABS/MBS market and exchange traded shares between 1998 and 2004 with and without the presence of cointegration. Our causality framework delivers compelling empirical support for a strong co-movement between matched price series of ABS-equity pairs, where ABS markets seem to contribute more to price discovery over the long run. Controlling for cointegration, risk-free interest and average market risk of corporate debt hardly alters our results. However, once we qualify the magnitude and direction of price discovery on various security characteristics, such as the ABS asset class, we find that ABS-equity pairs with large-scale CMBS/RMBS and credit card/student loan ABS reveal stronger lead-lag relationships and joint price dynamics than whole business ABS. JEL Classifications: G10, G12, G2

Ratings Migration and the Business Cycle, With Application to Credit Portfolio Stress Testing

The turmoil in the capital markets in 1997 and 1998 has highlighted the need for systematic stress testing of banks' portfolios, including both their trading and lending books. We propose that underlying macroeconomic volatility is a key part of a useful conceptual framework for stress testing credit portfolios, and that credit migration matrices provide the specific linkages between underlying macroeconomic conditions and asset quality. Credit migration matrices, which characterize the expected changes in credit quality of obligors, are cardinal inputs to many applications, including portfolio risk assessment, modeling the term structure of credit risk premia, and pricing of credit derivatives. They are also an integral part of many of the credit portfolio models used by financial institutions. By separating the economy into two states or regimes, expansion and contraction, and conditioning the migration matrix on these states, we show that the loss distribution of credit portfolios can differ greatly, as can the concomitant level of economic capital to be assigned.Credit risk, stress testing, ratings migration, credit portfolio management

Corporate bond prices and idiosyncratic risk: evidence from Australia

In this paper we investigate the bond price effect upon the information arrival of firm-specific idiosyncratic risk. We consider idiosyncratic dispersion and idiosyncratic volatility that capture, respectively, the direction of information and the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk. We find that idiosyncratic volatility does not affect bond prices, while the direction of idiosyncratic risk which reflects the favorable or unfavorable information exhibits impacts on bond prices. Idiosyncratic dispersion in the stock return of a firm in the preceding week, in general, is positively associated with bond price changes in the current week. This effect is most pronounced for firms exhibiting characteristics associated with lower default risk

Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) : a primer

The following descriptive paper surveys the various types of loan securitisation and provides a working definition of so-called collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). Free of the common rhetoric and slogans, which sometimes substitute for understanding of the complex nature of structured finance, this paper describes the theoretical foundations of this specialised form of loan securitisation. Not only the distinctive properties of CLOs, but also the information economics inherent in the transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the structuring of CLO transactions

Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review.

Credit ratings produced by the major credit rating agencies (CRAs) aim to measure the creditworthiness, or more specifically the relative creditworthiness of companies, i.e. their ability to meet their debt servicing obligations. In principle, the rating process focuses on the fundamental long-term credit strength of a company. It is typically based on both public and private information, except for unsolicited ratings, which focus only on public information. The basic rationale for using ratings is to achieve information economies of scale and solve principal-agent problems. Partly for the same reasons, the role of credit ratings has expanded significantly over time. Regulators, banks and bondholders, pension fund trustees and other fiduciary agents have increasingly used ratings-based criteria to constrain behaviour. As a result, the influence of the opinions of CRAs on markets appears to have grown considerably in recent years. One aspect of this development is its potential impact on market dynamics (i.e. the timing and path of asset price adjustments, credit spreads, etc.), either directly, as a consequence of the information content of ratings themselves, or indirectly, as a consequence of the “hardwiring” of ratings into regulatory rules, fund management mandates, bond covenants, etc. When considering the impact of ratings and rating changes, two conclusions are worth highlighting. – First, ratings correlate moderately well with observed credit spreads, and rating changes with changes in spreads. However, other factors, such as liquidity, taxation and historical volatility clearly also enter into the determination of spreads. Recent research suggests that reactions to rating changes may also extend beyond the immediately-affected company to its peers, and from bond to equity prices. Furthermore, this price reaction to rating changes seems to be asymmetrical, i.e. more pronounced for downgrades than for upgrades, and may be more significant for equity prices than for bond prices. – Second, the hardwiring of regulatory and market rules, bond covenants, investment guidelines, etc., to ratings may influence market dynamics, and potentially lead to or magnify threshold effects. The more that different market participants adopt identical ratings-linked rules, or are subject to similar ratings-linked regulations, the more “spiky” the reaction to a credit event is likely to be. This reaction may include, in some cases, the emergence of severe liquidity pressures. Efforts have recently been made, notably with support from the rating agencies themselves, to encourage a more systematic disclosure of rating triggers and to renegotiate and smooth the possibly more destabilising forms of rating triggers. However, the lack of a clear disclosure regime makes it difficult to assess how far this process has evolved. Questions also remain as to the extent to which ratings-based criteria introduce a fundamentally new element into market behaviour, or, conversely, the extent to which they are simply a va riant of more traditional contractual covenants. Rating agencies strive to provide credit assessments that remain broadly stable through the course of the business cycle (rating “through the cycle”). Agencies and other analysts frequently contrast the fundamental credit analysis on which ratings are based with market sentiment — measured for example by bond spreads — which is arguably subject to more short-term influences. Agencies are adamant that they do not directly incorporate market sentiment into ratings (although they may use market prices as a diagnostic tool). On the contrary, they make every effort to exclude transient market sentiment. However, as reliance on ratings grows, CRAs are being increasingly expected to satisfy a widening range of constituencies, with different, and even sometimes conflicting, interests: issuers and “traditional” asset managers will look for more than a simple statement of near-term probability of loss, and will stress the need for ratings to exhibit some degree of stability over time. On the other hand, mark-to-market traders, active investors and risk managers may seek more frequent indications of credit changes. Hence, in the wake of major bankruptcies with heightened credit stress, rating agencies have been under considerable pressure to provide higher-frequency readings of credit status, without loss of quality. So far, they have responded to this challenge largely by adding more products to their traditional range, but also through modifications in the rating process. The rating process and the range of products offered by rating agencies have thus evolved over time, with, for instance, an increasing emphasis on the analysis of liquidity risks, a new focus on the hidden liabilities of companies and an increased use of market-based tools. It is too early, however, to judge whether these changes should simply be regarded as a refinement of the agencies’ traditional methodology or whether they suggest a more fundamental shift in the approach to credit risk measurement. For the same reason, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about changes in the effects of credit ratings on market dynamics.

The adjustment of credit ratings of defaulted issuers

We provide insights into determinants of the rating level of 371 issuers which defaulted in the years 1999 to 2003, and into the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The evidence for the rating level suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods before the default event. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causal-ity, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild down-grades. Further, our analysis of rating changes shows that issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also find that larger issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers

Asset securitisation as a risk management and funding tool : what does it hold in store for SMES?

The following chapter critically surveys the attendant benefits and drawbacks of asset securitisation on both financial institutions and firms. It also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the securitisation of SME-related obligations from a cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as a foray of asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial system paired with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial production. JEL Classification: D81, G15, M2

What Determines the Structure of Corporate Debt Issues?

Publicly-traded debt securities differ on a number of dimensions, including quality, maturity, seniority, security, and convertibility. Finance research has provided a number of theories as to why firms should issue debt with different features; yet, there is very little empirical work testing these theories. We consider a sample of 14,867 debt issues in the U.S. between 1971 and 2004. Our goal is to test the implications of these theories, and, more generally, to establish a set of stylized facts regarding the circumstances under which firms issue different types of debt. Our results suggest that there are three main types of factors that affect the structure of debt issues: First, firm-specific factors such as leverage, growth opportunities and cash holdings are related with the convertibility, maturity and security structure of issued bonds. Second, economy-wide factors, in particular the state of the macroeconomy, affect the quality distribution of securities offered; in particular, during recessions, firms issue fewer poor quality bonds than in good times but similar numbers of high-quality bonds. Finally, controlling for firm characteristics and economy-wide factors, project specific factors appear to influence the types of securities that are issued. Consistent with commonly stated 'maturity-matching' arguments, long-term, nonconvertible bonds are more likely to be issued by firms investing in fixed assets, while convertible and short-term bonds are more likely to finance investment in R&D.

Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings: A Global Perspective

We conducted a global study of the long-term issuer ratings of nonfinancial firms from Standard and Poor's Ratings Services (S&P) for the period 1998–2003. Specifically, we focused on the solicited versus unsolicited ratings and sample-selection bias in the analysis. Unlike the literature, we adopted an improved method using Wooldridge’s instrumental-variable approach to mitigate the concern of specification errors in Heckman’s model. We found that the probability of seeking a long-term issuer rating is positively related to the size and profitability of the firm, and negatively related to the growth opportunities and debt levels of the firm. The credit rating is positively related to the sovereign rating, size, and profitability of the issuer, and negatively related to the debt ratio of the issuer. Consistent with the literature, we found sample-selection bias in credit ratings. Our findings suggest that the firms with solicited ratings seem to be more profitable, more liquid, and have lower leverage than the issuers with unsolicited ratings. After controlling for sample-selection bias and some key financial ratios, we found that unsolicited firms, on average, seem to have lower long-term issuer ratings.corporate long-term issuer ratings; solicited and unsolicited

"Convertible Bond Underpricing: Renegotiable Covenants, Seasoning and Convergence"

We investigate the long-standing puzzle on the underpricings of convertible bonds. We hypothesize that the observed underpricing is induced by the possibility that a convertible bond might renegotiate on some of its covenants, e.g., an imbedded put option, in financial difficulties. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the initial underpricing is larger for lower rated bonds. The underpricing worsens if the issuer experiences subsequent financial difficulties. However, conditional on no rating downgrades, our main empirical result shows that convertible bond prices do converge to their theoretical prices within two years. This seasoning period is shorter for higher rated convertible bonds.