An Efficient Protocol for Negotiation over Combinatorial Domains with Incomplete Information

We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common knowledge. Self-interested agents often end up negotiating inefficient agreements in such situations. In this paper, we present a protocol for negotiation in combinatorial domains which can lead rational agents to reach optimal agreements under incomplete information setting. Our proposed protocol enables the negotiating agents to identify efficient solutions using distributed search that visits only a small subspace of the whole outcome space. Moreover, the proposed protocol is sufficiently general that it is applicable to most preference representation models in combinatorial domains. We also present results of experiments that demonstrate the feasibility and computational efficiency of our approach

Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually

Designing a Multiagent System for Course-Offering Determination

I attended a doctoral symposium of the conference. It was very good to know about how to guide PhD students to conduct high-quality research and complete PhD program. I attended all the keynote sessions of the conference. The presentation on Computational Disaster Management by Professor Pascal Van Hentenryck was very insightful and encouraging. The talk on “Agents might not be people” by Professor Nigel Gilbert was illuminating. The talk on “Satisfiability to Linear Algebra” by Professor Fangzhen Lin was revealing. I attended almost all sections of PRIMA 2013 and some presentations of AI 2013. They reflect the advancement of the field. The discussions with the people on-site were very interesting and helpful to my future research. Also, it was great to talk to active researchers in the field and exchanged ideas of our research and explored the possibility of collaboration.This paper describes the design of a multiagent system that facilitates course-offering decision making for a program in an institution. We first model course offering determination for upcoming semester as a multi-winner election with exogenous constraints which is a problem for computational social choice in multiagent systems, which has rarely been considered. Then, the paper describes the architecture and models of the multiagent system for course offering determination with Gaia role model methodology, TROPOS strategic actor diagram, Agent Unified Modeling Language (AUML) sequence diagram for a multi-agent negotiation interaction protocol, and Pseudo-code algorithms for generating fractional votes and course election protocol. A novel course selection preference model for students has been proposed and described formally. The effectiveness of the approach and the implemented system has been showed with the initial experimental results

Coordination approaches and systems - part I : a strategic perspective

This is the first part of a two-part paper presenting a fundamental review and summary of research of design coordination and cooperation technologies. The theme of this review is aimed at the research conducted within the decision management aspect of design coordination. The focus is therefore on the strategies involved in making decisions and how these strategies are used to satisfy design requirements. The paper reviews research within collaborative and coordinated design, project and workflow management, and, task and organization models. The research reviewed has attempted to identify fundamental coordination mechanisms from different domains, however it is concluded that domain independent mechanisms need to be augmented with domain specific mechanisms to facilitate coordination. Part II is a review of design coordination from an operational perspective