Houses in a Landscape: Memory and Everyday Life in Mesoamerica

In Houses in a Landscape, Julia A. Hendon examines the connections between social identity and social memory using archaeological research on indigenous societies that existed more than one thousand years ago in what is now Honduras. While these societies left behind monumental buildings, the remains of their dead, remnants of their daily life, intricate works of art, and fine examples of craftsmanship such as pottery and stone tools, they left only a small body of written records. Despite this paucity of written information, Hendon contends that an archaeological study of memory in such societies is possible and worthwhile. It is possible because memory is not just a faculty of the individual mind operating in isolation, but a social process embedded in the materiality of human existence. Intimately bound up in the relations people develop with one another and with the world around them through what they do, where and how they do it, and with whom or what, memory leaves material traces. Hendon conducted research on three contemporaneous Native American civilizations that flourished from the seventh century through the eleventh CE: the Maya kingdom of Copan, the hilltop center of Cerro Palenque, and the dispersed settlement of the Cuyumapa valley. She analyzes domestic life in these societies, from cooking to crafting, as well as public and private ritual events including the ballgame. Combining her findings with a rich body of theory from anthropology, history, and geography, she explores how objects—the things people build, make, use, exchange, and discard—help people remember. In so doing, she demonstrates how everyday life becomes part of the social processes of remembering and forgetting, and how “memory communities” assert connections between the past and the present.https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/1050/thumbnail.jp

Situating care in mainstream health economics: an ethical dilemma?

Standard health economics concentrates on the provision of care by medical professionals. Yet ‘care’ receives scant analysis; it is portrayed as a spillover effect or externality in the form of interdependent utility functions. In this context care can only be conceived as either acts of altruism or as social capital. Both conceptions are subject to considerable problems stemming from mainstream health economics’ reliance on a reductionist social model built around instrumental rationality and consequentialism. Subsequently, this implies a disregard for moral rules and duties and the compassionate aspects of behaviour. Care as an externality is a second-order concern relative to self-interested utility maximization, and is therefore crowded out by the parameters of the standard model. We outline an alternative relational approach to conceptualising care based on the social embeddedness of the individual that emphasises the ethical properties of care. The deontological dimension of care suggests that standard health economics is likely to undervalue the importance of care and caring in medicine

Demystifying Sraffa’s Theory of Value in the Light of Arrow and Debreu

This paper compares the models of Arrow and Debreu [1954] and Sraffa [1960], and concludes that (1) the models are informationally distinct conceptions of a capitalist economy, (2) they support radically distinct – though complete and entirely correct – theories of value, (3) the prices in the two theories are different both in terms of definitions and values, (4) in Sraffa‘s model it is impossible to define constant returns to scale, while in Arrow-Debreu this property is admissible, and (5) in Arrow-Debreu the interpersonal income distribution is determined whereas in Srafa‘s model the distribution of income between workers and capitalists is undetermined.constant returns to scale, theory of value, relations of production, counterfactual information, prices, exchange values, income distribution, general equilibrium, capital, marginal product

Process, System, Causality, and Quantum Mechanics, A Psychoanalysis of Animal Faith

We shall argue in this paper that a central piece of modern physics does not really belong to physics at all but to elementary probability theory. Given a joint probability distribution J on a set of random variables containing x and y, define a link between x and y to be the condition x=y on J. Define the {\it state} D of a link x=y as the joint probability distribution matrix on x and y without the link. The two core laws of quantum mechanics are the Born probability rule, and the unitary dynamical law whose best known form is the Schrodinger's equation. Von Neumann formulated these two laws in the language of Hilbert space as prob(P) = trace(PD) and D'T = TD respectively, where P is a projection, D and D' are (von Neumann) density matrices, and T is a unitary transformation. We'll see that if we regard link states as density matrices, the algebraic forms of these two core laws occur as completely general theorems about links. When we extend probability theory by allowing cases to count negatively, we find that the Hilbert space framework of quantum mechanics proper emerges from the assumption that all D's are symmetrical in rows and columns. On the other hand, Markovian systems emerge when we assume that one of every linked variable pair has a uniform probability distribution. By representing quantum and Markovian structure in this way, we see clearly both how they differ, and also how they can coexist in natural harmony with each other, as they must in quantum measurement, which we'll examine in some detail. Looking beyond quantum mechanics, we see how both structures have their special places in a much larger continuum of formal systems that we have yet to look for in nature.Comment: LaTex, 86 page