E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,

The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources

This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights;

A Conceptual Framework for Investigating Suppliers’ Participation in Business-to-Government (B2G) Electronic Auction Markets in the Thai Context

Business-to-government (B2G) electronic auction (e-auction) markets are increasingly being used to create opportunities for suppliers to expand their market as well as trading activities. However, little has been done to understand the behaviour of suppliers participating in these markets. In this paper, we propose a framework to explain suppliers’ intention to participate, and the level of participation in B2G e-auction markets, which will be tested in the Thai B2G e-auction markets. Low supplier participation has been a major problem in the Thai e-auction markets. We posit that suppliers’ participation depends on organisational motivation, environmental uncertainty, and their capabilities. The conceptual framework draws from the Motivation-Ability Framework, Transaction Cost Theory, Institutional Theory, and Resource-Based Theory. It proposes that four key constructs - efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, environmental uncertainty, and organisational capabilities influence suppliers’ intention to participate as well as their participation level in B2G e-auction markets

Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report

This report describes the design, development and trial of catchment care. Catchment Care is an auction-based system which aims to increase the cost effectiveness of funds for private on-ground natural resource management actions.Water;Australia;Natural Resource Management;Catchment Care; auction.

Measurements, feedback and empowerment: Critical systems theory as a basis for software process improvement

Despite business-to-government (B2G) electronic auction (e-auction) markets being a way for suppliers to create opportunities for market expansion and for trading activities, little has been done to understand the behaviour of suppliers participating in these markets. In this paper, we propose a framework to explain suppliers’ intention to participate, and the level of participation in B2G eauction markets, which will be tested in the Thai B2G e-auction markets. Low supplier participation has been a major problem in the Thai e-auction markets. We posit that suppliers’ participation depends on organisational motivation, environmental uncertainty, and their capabilities. The conceptual framework draws from the Motivation-Ability Framework, Transaction Cost Theory, Institutional Theory, and Resource-Based Theory. It proposes that four key constructs - efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, environmental uncertainty, and organisational capabilities influence suppliers’ intention to participate as well as their participation level in B2G e-auction markets. The conceptual framework is developed by drawing on our understanding of the Thai electronic auction market as well as from extensive literature. We believe this framework may be useful to better understand the key reasons for suppliers to participate in B2G e-auction markets

Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings.Multiple units, non-constant costs, asymmetric redemption values, alternative procurement mechanisms

Antecedents of Suppliers’ Participation in Business-to- Government (B2G) Electronic Auction Markets: Thai B2G E-Auction

Despite business-to-government (B2G) electronic auction (e-auction) markets being a way for suppliers to create opportunities for market expansion and for trading activities, the effort to understand the behaviour of suppliers participating in these markets has been lacking. Low supplier participation has been a major problem in Thai e-auction markets. In this paper, we propose a framework to explain suppliers’ intention to participate, and the level of participation in B2G e-auction markets. We posit that suppliers’ participation depends on organizational motivation, and their capabilities. The conceptual framework draws from the Motivation-Ability Framework, Transaction Cost Theory, Institutional Theory, and Resource-Based Theory. It proposes that three key constructs - efficiency motive, legitimacy motive, and organizational capabilities influence suppliers’ intention to participate as well as their participation level in B2G e-auction markets. The conceptual framework may be useful to better understand the key reasons for suppliers to participate in B2G e-auction markets. We also provide rationale for each of the Proceedings of SIG GlobDev’s First Annual Workshop, Paris, France December 13th 2008 Dolpanya et al. Suppliers’ Participation in B2G E-Auctions proposed constructs by drawing on our understanding of the Thai electronic auction market as well as the existing literature