ナチュラル・ペダゴジ一理論の行方

The paper is a critical comment on Okumura & Kanakogi (2019)

A comment on "The Cauchy problem of f(R)- gravity", Class. Quantum Grav., 24, 5667 (2007), arXiv:0709.4414

A critical comment on [N. Lanahan--Tremblay and V. Faraoni, 2007, {\it Class. Quantum Grav.}, {\bf 24}, 5667, arXiv:0709.4414] is given discussing the well-formulation of the Chauchy problem for $f(R)$-gravity in metric-affine theories.Comment: 3 page

Finlay on Legitimate Authority: A Critical Comment

Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the aggressive side to use military violence against soldiers defending the victim state. Non-state actors, in contrast, have to fulfill more stringent requirements. If they do not, then even their attacks on military personnel can properly be called "terrorist." In the following I will argue that Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the legitimate authority criterion of just war theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence has to satisfy heavier burdens of justification than state violence fails for a number of reasons: his claim that defenders would wrong victims if they defended them against their will is mistaken, he overlooks the fact that non-state agents need not claim to fight on someone’s behalf, the full moral authority he mentions is redundant, the powers he ascribes to “Lesser Moral Authority” are, depending on interpretation, either morally irrelevant or nonexistent, and his claim that granting states “Lesser Moral Authority” is beneficial from a “moral pragmatic” point of view while granting the same authority to non-state actors is not, is unwarranted

Home sweet home: a critical comment on Saunders and Williams

While accepting the need for research which focuses on the social meaning of the home, this article takes issue with some of Saunders’ and Williams’ formulations for a research programme — in particular, the emphasis given to physical and design features of the home at the expense of an understanding of more fundamental gender and generational relations within the home. It attempts to uncover the assumptions lying behind those formulations, to clarify some of the conceptual confusions, and to point out some of the serious theoretical difficulties which such formulations have to resolve. It argues that theoretical advance in this area does not have to depend upon the adoption of a Weberian perspective, but must be situated within a broader theory of the production and maintenance of ideology, and this theory must be explicitly linked with theories of power and kinship. In particular, it is emphasised that power relations within the home, associated mainly with gender and age differences, need to be investigated in greater depth if the social significance of the home is to be properly understood