31,964 research outputs found
Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet
Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to reach the users of
another network, Internet Content Providers (CPs) do not pay the Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) of users they reach. While the consequent cross
subsidization to CPs has nurtured content innovations at the edge of the
Internet, it reduces the investment incentives for the access ISPs to expand
capacity. As potential charges for terminating CPs' traffic are criticized
under the net neutrality debate, we propose to allow CPs to voluntarily
subsidize the usagebased fees induced by their content traffic for end-users.
We model the regulated subsidization competition among CPs under a neutral
network and show how deregulation of subsidization could increase an access
ISP's utilization and revenue, strengthening its investment incentives.
Although the competition might harm certain CPs, we find that the main cause
comes from high access prices rather than the existence of subsidization. Our
results suggest that subsidization competition will increase the
competitiveness and welfare of the Internet content market; however, regulators
might need to regulate access prices if the access ISP market is not
competitive enough. We envision that subsidization competition could become a
viable model for the future Internet
Using Tuangou to reduce IP transit costs
A majority of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) support connectivity to the entire Internet by transiting their traffic via other providers. Although the transit prices per Mbps decline steadily, the overall transit costs of these ISPs remain high or even increase, due to the traffic growth. The discontent of the ISPs with the high transit costs has yielded notable innovations such as peering, content distribution networks, multicast, and peer-to-peer localization. While the above solutions tackle the problem by reducing the transit traffic, this paper explores a novel approach that reduces the transit costs without altering the traffic. In the proposed CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit), multiple ISPs cooperate to jointly purchase IP (Internet Protocol) transit in bulk. The aggregate transit costs decrease due to the economies-of-scale effect of typical subadditive pricing as well as burstable billing: not all ISPs transit their peak traffic during the same period. To distribute the aggregate savings among the CIPT partners, we propose Shapley-value sharing of the CIPT transit costs. Using public data about IP traffic of 264 ISPs and transit prices, we quantitatively evaluate CIPT and show that significant savings can be achieved, both in relative and absolute terms. We also discuss the organizational embodiment, relationship with transit providers, traffic confidentiality, and other aspects of CIPT
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE QUALITY OF SERVICE IN INTERCONNECTION
This paper analyses the structure of the Internet marketplace and the business relationships of key players involved in network services provision. A brief overview of existing pricing policies and research work in this area is presented and some new issues are introduced. We believe that the role of information asymmetry is critical when considering agreements for Internet access and interconnection. In negotiation and contract preparation, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection. The current structure of connectivity agreements does not address information asymmetries thus allowing the possibility of opportunistic behaviour in the form of moral hazard. Inasmuch as interconnection agreements involve sharing and/or exchanging network resources, either party will tend to exploit the agreement to its own advantage (i.e. conserving its own resources) and, possibly, to the detriment of the other (i.e. overutilising the other’s resources). The discussion focuses on interconnection agreements between Internet Service Providers, namely peering and transit. The paper concludes with an outline of an incentive compatible mechanism that can sustain quality of service requirements in interconnection agreements.interconnection information asymmetry
Fairs for e-commerce: the benefits of aggregating buyers and sellers
In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online
business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition
between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed
and tends to rise. Other models, including group-buying, are based on
cooperation between users, characterized by a dynamic price of the product that
tends to go down. There is not yet a business model in which both sellers and
buyers are grouped in order to negotiate on a specific product or service. The
present study investigates a new extension of the group-buying model, called
fair, which allows aggregation of demand and supply for price optimization, in
a cooperative manner. Additionally, our system also aggregates products and
destinations for shipping optimization. We introduced the following new
relevant input parameters in order to implement a double-side aggregation: (a)
price-quantity curves provided by the seller; (b) waiting time, that is, the
longer buyers wait, the greater discount they get; (c) payment time, which
determines if the buyer pays before, during or after receiving the product; (d)
the distance between the place where products are available and the place of
shipment, provided in advance by the buyer or dynamically suggested by the
system. To analyze the proposed model we implemented a system prototype and a
simulator that allow to study effects of changing some input parameters. We
analyzed the dynamic price model in fairs having one single seller and a
combination of selected sellers. The results are very encouraging and motivate
further investigation on this topic
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