The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States

This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring structural policy windows' and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the theory that these interests are attempting to have legislators attach (de)regulatory riders to the budget bills. Overall, the paper demonstrates that these structural policy windows largely determine lobbying expenditures.

The Limited Viability of Dual Exchange-Rate Regimes

This paper examines the viability of dual exchange-rate regimes. Typically, under such a regime the exchange rates applicable to current-account(commercial) transactions and to capital-account (financial) transactions differ from each other. This difference may be determined in the free market if the authorities peg the commercial exchange rate and set a binding quota on external borrowing, or it may result from direct pegging of both exchange rates. The analysis starts with a specification of the characteristics of the distortion introduced by the exchange-rate premium (that is, the percentage discrepancy between the financial and the commercial exchange rates), and then provides explicit formula for the equilibrium premium, for its evolution over time and for the welfare cost induced by the distortion. The paper outlines the set of policy options consistent with sustaining a permanently viable dual exchange-rate system and highlights the severe constraints that intertemporal solvency requirements of the private sector and of the government impose on the long-run viability of the regime. The paper concludes with an analysis of the monetary changes associated with dual exchange-rate policies and draws the implications of such a regime for the intertemporal distribution of taxes and for the intergenerational distribution of welfare.

DO HOUSEHOLDS FULLY SHARE RISK? EVIDENCE FROM GHANA

Intrahousehold analyses provide new insights into how households make economic decisions. Much of the work in economics has traditionally treated the household as a single economic actor, but a number of studies are providing evidence that the dynamics among household members affect the outcomes of household economic decisions. This paper contributes to our understanding of such models by incorporating the variability of individual incomes into the analysis of intrahousehold resource allocations, using detailed household survey data from Ghana.Consumer/Household Economics, Risk and Uncertainty,

Who adjusts and when? On the political economy of reforms

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments, (i. e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.

Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.

Learning From Experience With Performance Assessment Frameworks for General Budget Support

This report provides the findings of a study financed by SECO and undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC multi-country evaluation of General Budget Support (GBS). The overall objective was to gather preliminary lessons on what could be good international practice in the development\ud of Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAFs) for GBS. The study is based on the experience of three countries which have adopted harmonised PAFs – namely Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, and two which are moving in this direction – Benin and Nicaragua. In order to assess the effectiveness of these PAFs, the study employed a simplified, standard framework reflecting the OECD-DAC guiding principles for the provision of budget support.\u

Collecting and transferring pension contributions

Collecting social security contributions is an important operational issue in all types of pension systems. Many regimes are plagued by poor compliance and weak, inefficient administration. Some countries have tried to introduce an automatic incentive to contribute by moving systems closer to"actuarial fairness,"where pension benefits are more strictly related to individual contributions. Examples include the systems of individual accounts introduced in a range of countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe. But in these regimes, collecting and transferring contributions is a more complex process. This paper considers different aspects of collecting pension contributions. In the first section the authors describe the most serious problems affecting collection systems in several countries. Section 2 presents the conceptual relationships between alternative pension-system models and collection systems. Section 3 deals with the differences between centralized and decentralized collection systems and their advantages and disadvantages. Section 4 looks at operational issues. Section 5 compares experiences of the collection systems in a range of different countries. Section 6 looks at problems of regulation and supervision, while the final section presents conclusions.Pensions&Retirement Systems,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Stabilization,National Governance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation

Who Adjusts and When?The Political Economy of Reforms

Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war-of-attrition model to guide our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when times of crisis occur, when new governments take office, when governments are "strong" (that is, presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive branch faces fewer constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problems of reverse causality are possible. Copyright 2006, International Monetary Fund