CSI Neural Network: Using Side-channels to Recover Your Artificial Neural Network Information

Machine learning has become mainstream across industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse engineer a neural network by using only power side-channel information. To this end, we consider a multilayer perceptron as the machine learning architecture of choice and assume a non-invasive and eavesdropping attacker capable of measuring only passive side-channel leakages like power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and reaction time. We conduct all experiments on real data and common neural net architectures in order to properly assess the applicability and extendability of those attacks. Practical results are shown on an ARM CORTEX-M3 microcontroller. Our experiments show that the side-channel attacker is capable of obtaining the following information: the activation functions used in the architecture, the number of layers and neurons in the layers, the number of output classes, and weights in the neural network. Thus, the attacker can effectively reverse engineer the network using side-channel information. Next, we show that once the attacker has the knowledge about the neural network architecture, he/she could also recover the inputs to the network with only a single-shot measurement. Finally, we discuss several mitigations one could use to thwart such attacks.Comment: 15 pages, 16 figure

The economic dimensions of prolonged occupation: continuity and change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinian economy

- There is no Israeli economic policy towards the Palestinian people or the occupied territory; rather there is a policy to maintain occupation and administration of the Palestinian territory by whatever means available, including economic strategies; - Israeli strategies deployed since 1967 have included economic inducements to improve the quality of life, devolution, and other schemes focused on promoting individual welfare but not preventing communal poverty; - The Oslo Accords and the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) of 1994 formalized the de facto customs union in operation under occupation and locked in the adverse path of dependence of the Palestinian economy upon Israel; - Palestinian Authority institutions have been unable to establish sovereign or even autonomous institutions capable of expanding the space for economic policymaking and for economic polices promoting long-term development; - The effects of Israel’s dual strategy of skewed economic integration coupled with physical separation has led, over forty years, to divergence in per capita incomes between Israel and the territory, rather than the convergence promised by economic theory and the premises of the customs union; - Instead of continuing to repeatedly reform the facades of interim self-government, all efforts should aim to form the sovereign institutions for statehood; - New Israeli overtures under the heading of “economic peace” risk not only diverting attention from political processes, but also hark back to an era of Israeli domination of the Palestinian economy, which demonstrably failed; - Though the PER may have outlived its design and usefulness, it can only be superseded if a fundamentally different framework is envisaged, rooted in ensuring Palestinian sovereignty, statehood and economic viability; - A Palestinian economic strategy for sovereignty and peace would entail seeking recognition of the Palestinian economy as a separate customs territory, and would become the reference point for formulation of economic policy, institution-building, decision-making, and international economic relations; - Such a status would offer a platform for building a viable, vibrant and secure national economy for the envisioned State of Palestine, governed by a framework which adheres, among other principles, to the multilateral rules and disciplines embodied in the World Trade Organization; - Only through a Palestinian economic policy framework that is predicated on the separate, internationally recognized status of the economy of the occupied territory, which in turn helps to create the conditions to end occupation, can a viable Palestinian economy and a sovereign State emerge to deliver the promise of peace.Palestinian economy, occupied Palestinian territories

State and trends of carbon pricing 2015

Introduction Reflecting the growing momentum for carbon pricing worldwide, the 2015 edition of the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing report targets a wider audience of public and private stakeholders who are engaged in carbon pricing design and implementation. This report also provides critical input for the negotiations leading up to the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. As in the previous editions, the report provides an up-to-date overview of existing and emerging carbon pricing instruments around the world, including national and subnational initiatives. Furthermore, it gives an overview of current corporate carbon pricing instruments. To better reflect the plethora of topics being considered in the climate dialogue, the report also analyzes competitiveness and carbon leakage, and their impact on the development of carbon pricing instruments. The task team responsible for this report intends to select new relevant topics to be explored in future editions. These topics could include, for example, the effectiveness of existing and emerging carbon pricing instruments, and how to measure it. Finally, this year’s report gives the audience a forward-looking assessment of the advantages of international cooperation in reaching stringent global mitigation targets. A review of existing modeling work provides a qualitative and quantitative assessment of cost saving potentials and the magnitude of financial flows inherent to international cooperation aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent with the 2°C climate stabilization goal

Climate Change Policy, and Policy Change in China

Solving the climate change problem by limiting global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will necessitate action by the world’s two largest emitters, the United States and China. Neither has so far committed to quantitative emissions limits. Some argue that China cannot be engaged on the basis of its national interest in climate policy, on the ground that China’s national net benefits of limiting greenhouse gas emissions would be negative, as a result of significant GHG abatement costs and potential net gains to China from a warmer world. This premise has led some observers to advocate other approaches to engaging China, such as appeal to moral obligation. This Article argues that appeal to national net benefits is still the best approach to engage China. First, appealing to China’s asserted moral obligation to limit its GHG emissions may be ineffective or even counterproductive. Even if climate change is a moral issue for American leaders, framing the issue that way may not be persuasive to Chinese leaders. Second, the concern that China’s national net benefits of climate policy are negative is based on older forecasts of costs and benefits. More recent climate science, of which the Chinese leadership is aware, indicates higher damages to China from climate change and thus greater net benefits to China from climate policy. Third, the public health co-benefits of reducing other air pollutants along with GHGs may make GHG emissions limits look more attractive to China. Fourth, the distribution of climate impacts within China may be as important as the net aggregate: climate change may exacerbate political and social stresses within China, which the leadership may seek to avoid in order to maintain political stability. Fifth, the costs of abatement may decline as innovation in China accelerates. Sixth, as China becomes a great power in world politics, and as climate change affects China’s allies, leadership on climate policy may look more favorable to China’s elites. Seventh, the design of the international climate treaty regime itself can offer positive incentives to China. Taken together, these factors point to a potential and even ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy. They illustrate how the international law and politics of climate change depend on domestic politics and institutions. And they suggest that the United States, if it too takes effective action, can make the case for enlightened pragmatism as a basis to engage China in a cooperative global climate policy regime

Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law

This article recommends the key design elements of US climate law. Much past environmental law has suffered from four design problems: fragmentation, insensitivity to tradeoffs, rigid prescriptive commands, and mismatched scale. These are problems with the design of regulatory systems, not a rejection of the overall objective of environmental law to protect ecosystems and human health. These four design defects raised the costs, reduced the benefits, and increased the countervailing risks of many past environmental laws. The principal environmental laws successfully enacted since the 1990s, such as the acid rain trading program in the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments and the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act amendments, were consciously designed to overcome the prior design defects. New law for climate change should improve on the design of past environmental law, fostering four counterpart solutions to the prior design defects: cross-cutting integration instead of fragmentation, attention to tradeoffs instead of their neglect, flexible incentive-based policy instruments such as emissions trading in place of rigid prescriptive commands, and optimal instead of mismatched scale. This article advocates a design for U.S. climate policy that embodies these four design solutions. It proposes a policy that is comprehensive in its coverage of multiple pollutants (all GHGs), their sources and sinks; multiple sectors (indeed economy-wide); and multiple issues currently divided among separate agencies. It advocates explicit attention to tradeoffs, both benefit-cost and risk-risk (including both ancillary harms and ancillary benefits), in setting the goals and boundaries of climate policy. It advocates the use of flexible market-based incentives through an efficient cap-and-trade system, with most allowances auctioned along multi-year emissions reduction schedules that are reviewed periodically in light of new information. And it advocates matching the legal regime to the environmental and economic scale of the climate problem, starting at the global level, engaging all the major emitting countries (including the U.S. and China), and then implementing at the national and sub-national levels rather than a patchwork bottom-up approach. In so doing it addresses the roles of EPA regulation under the current CAA and of new legislation. It argues that among environmental issues, climate change is ideally suited to adopt these improved policy design features