A Promise Theoretic Account of the Boeing 737 Max MCAS Algorithm Affair

Many public controversies involve the assessment of statements about which we have imperfect information. Without a structured approach, it is quite difficult to develop an approach to reasoning which is not based on ad hoc choices. Forms of logic have been used in the past to try to bring such clarity, but these fail for a variety of reasons. We demonstrate a simple approach to bringing a standardized approach to semantics, in certain discourse, using Promise Theory. As a case, we use Promise Theory (PT) to collect and structure publicly available information about the case of the MCAS software component for the Boeing 737 Max flight control system

Candidate Software Process Flaws for the Boeing 737 Max MCAS Algorithm and Risks for a Proposed Upgrade

By reasoning about the claims and speculations promised as part of the public discourse, we analyze the hypothesis that flaws in software engineering played a critical role in the Boeing 737 MCAS incidents. We use promise-based reasoning to discuss how, from an outsider's perspective, one may assemble clues about what went wrong. Rather than looking for a Rational Alternative Design (RAD), as suggested by Wendel, we look for candidate flaws in the software process. We describe four such potential flaws. Recently, Boeing has circulated information on its envisaged MCAS algorithm upgrade. We cast this as a promise to resolve the flaws, i.e. to provide a RAD for the B737 Max. We offer an assessment of B-Max-New based on the public discourse.Comment: Sequel to arXiv:2001.01543 [cs.OH