A Stochastic Resource-Sharing Network for Electric Vehicle Charging

We consider a distribution grid used to charge electric vehicles such that voltage drops stay bounded. We model this as a class of resource-sharing networks, known as bandwidth-sharing networks in the communication network literature. We focus on resource-sharing networks that are driven by a class of greedy control rules that can be implemented in a decentralized fashion. For a large number of such control rules, we can characterize the performance of the system by a fluid approximation. This leads to a set of dynamic equations that take into account the stochastic behavior of EVs. We show that the invariant point of these equations is unique and can be computed by solving a specific ACOPF problem, which admits an exact convex relaxation. We illustrate our findings with a case study using the SCE 47-bus network and several special cases that allow for explicit computations.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

On Formal Methods for Collective Adaptive System Engineering. {Scalable Approximated, Spatial} Analysis Techniques. Extended Abstract

In this extended abstract a view on the role of Formal Methods in System Engineering is briefly presented. Then two examples of useful analysis techniques based on solid mathematical theories are discussed as well as the software tools which have been built for supporting such techniques. The first technique is Scalable Approximated Population DTMC Model-checking. The second one is Spatial Model-checking for Closure Spaces. Both techniques have been developed in the context of the EU funded project QUANTICOL.Comment: In Proceedings FORECAST 2016, arXiv:1607.0200

Spectrum Sharing in mmWave Cellular Networks via Cell Association, Coordination, and Beamforming

This paper investigates the extent to which spectrum sharing in mmWave networks with multiple cellular operators is a viable alternative to traditional dedicated spectrum allocation. Specifically, we develop a general mathematical framework by which to characterize the performance gain that can be obtained when spectrum sharing is used, as a function of the underlying beamforming, operator coordination, bandwidth, and infrastructure sharing scenarios. The framework is based on joint beamforming and cell association optimization, with the objective of maximizing the long-term throughput of the users. Our asymptotic and non-asymptotic performance analyses reveal five key points: (1) spectrum sharing with light on-demand intra- and inter-operator coordination is feasible, especially at higher mmWave frequencies (for example, 73 GHz), (2) directional communications at the user equipment substantially alleviate the potential disadvantages of spectrum sharing (such as higher multiuser interference), (3) large numbers of antenna elements can reduce the need for coordination and simplify the implementation of spectrum sharing, (4) while inter-operator coordination can be neglected in the large-antenna regime, intra-operator coordination can still bring gains by balancing the network load, and (5) critical control signals among base stations, operators, and user equipment should be protected from the adverse effects of spectrum sharing, for example by means of exclusive resource allocation. The results of this paper, and their extensions obtained by relaxing some ideal assumptions, can provide important insights for future standardization and spectrum policy.Comment: 15 pages. To appear in IEEE JSAC Special Issue on Spectrum Sharing and Aggregation for Future Wireless Network

Rational Trust Modeling

Trust models are widely used in various computer science disciplines. The main purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure trustworthiness of a set of entities based on their behaviors. In this article, the novel notion of "rational trust modeling" is introduced by bridging trust management and game theory. Note that trust models/reputation systems have been used in game theory (e.g., repeated games) for a long time, however, game theory has not been utilized in the process of trust model construction; this is where the novelty of our approach comes from. In our proposed setting, the designer of a trust model assumes that the players who intend to utilize the model are rational/selfish, i.e., they decide to become trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the utility that they can gain. In other words, the players are incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The problem of trust management can be then approached by game theoretical analyses and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Although rationality might be built-in in some existing trust models, we intend to formalize the notion of rational trust modeling from the designer's perspective. This approach will result in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model can incentivise trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper parameters into the trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish players in strategic trust-based interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios). Furthermore, using a rational trust model, we can prevent many well-known attacks on trust models. These two prominent properties also help us to predict behavior of the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses