Descent and penalization techniques for equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints

This paper deals with equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints. Exploiting a gap function recently introduced, which rely on a polyhedral approximation of the feasible region, we propose two descent methods. They are both based on the minimization of a suitable exact penalty function, but they use different rules for updating the penalization parameter and they rely on different types of line search. The convergence of both algorithms is proved under standard assumptions

Projection based algorithms for variational inequalities

This dissertation is about the theory and iterative algorithms for solving variational inequalities. Chapter 1 introduces the problem, various situations in which variational inequalities arise naturally, reformulations of the problem, several characteristics of the problem based on those reformulations, as well as the basic existence and uniqueness results. Following that, chapter 2 describes the general approaches to solving variational inequalities, focusing on projection based methods towards the end, with some convergence results. That chapter also discusses the merits and demerits of those approaches. In chapter 3, we describe a relaxed projection method, and a descent method for solving variational inequalities with some examples. An application of the descent framework to a game theory problem leads to an algorithm for solving box constrained variational inequalities. Relaxed projection methods require a sequence of parameters that approach zero, which leads to slow convergence as the iterates approach a solution. Chapter 4 describes a local convergence result that can be used as a guideline for finding a bound on the parameter as a relaxed projection algorithm reaches a solution

Robust optimization, game theory, and variational inequalities

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-109).We propose a robust optimization approach to analyzing three distinct classes of problems related to the notion of equilibrium: the nominal variational inequality (VI) problem over a polyhedron, the finite game under payoff uncertainty, and the network design problem under demand uncertainty. In the first part of the thesis, we demonstrate that the nominal VI problem is in fact a special instance of a robust constraint. Using this insight and duality-based proof techniques from robust optimization, we reformulate the VI problem over a polyhedron as a single- level (and many-times continuously differentiable) optimization problem. This reformulation applies even if the associated cost function has an asymmetric Jacobian matrix. We give sufficient conditions for the convexity of this reformulation and thereby identify a class of VIs, of which monotone affine (and possibly asymmetric) VIs are a special case, which may be solved using widely-available and commercial-grade convex optimization software. In the second part of the thesis, we propose a distribution-free model of incomplete- information games, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty.(cont.) Our "robust game" model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative, distribution-free equilibrium concept, for which, in contrast to ex post equilibria, existence is guaranteed. We show that computation of "robust-optimization equilibria" is analogous to that of Nash equilibria of complete- information games. Our results cover incomplete-information games either involving or not involving private information. In the third part of the thesis, we consider uncertainty on the part of a mechanism designer. Specifically, we present a novel, robust optimization model of the network design problem (NDP) under demand uncertainty and congestion effects, and under either system- optimal or user-optimal routing. We propose a corresponding branch and bound algorithm which comprises the first constructive use of the price of anarchy concept. In addition, we characterize conditions under which the robust NDP reduces to a less computationally demanding problem, either a nominal counterpart or a single-level quadratic optimization problem. Finally, we present a novel traffic "paradox," illustrating counterintuitive behavior of changes in cost relative to changes in demand.by Michele Leslie Aghassi.Ph.D