An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance

Consider a requester who wishes to crowdsource a series of identical binary labeling tasks to a pool of workers so as to achieve an assured accuracy for each task, in a cost optimal way. The workers are heterogeneous with unknown but fixed qualities and their costs are private. The problem is to select for each task an optimal subset of workers so that the outcome obtained from the selected workers guarantees a target accuracy level. The problem is a challenging one even in a non strategic setting since the accuracy of aggregated label depends on unknown qualities. We develop a novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanism for solving this problem. First, we propose a framework, Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB), which leads to an MAB algorithm, Constrained Confidence Bound for a Non Strategic setting (CCB-NS). We derive an upper bound on the number of time steps the algorithm chooses a sub-optimal set that depends on the target accuracy level and true qualities. A more challenging situation arises when the requester not only has to learn the qualities of the workers but also elicit their true costs. We modify the CCB-NS algorithm to obtain an adaptive exploration separated algorithm which we call { \em Constrained Confidence Bound for a Strategic setting (CCB-S)}. CCB-S algorithm produces an ex-post monotone allocation rule and thus can be transformed into an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism that learns the qualities of the workers and guarantees a given target accuracy level in a cost optimal way. We provide a lower bound on the number of times any algorithm should select a sub-optimal set and we see that the lower bound matches our upper bound upto a constant factor. We provide insights on the practical implementation of this framework through an illustrative example and we show the efficacy of our algorithms through simulations

Fairs for e-commerce: the benefits of aggregating buyers and sellers

In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed and tends to rise. Other models, including group-buying, are based on cooperation between users, characterized by a dynamic price of the product that tends to go down. There is not yet a business model in which both sellers and buyers are grouped in order to negotiate on a specific product or service. The present study investigates a new extension of the group-buying model, called fair, which allows aggregation of demand and supply for price optimization, in a cooperative manner. Additionally, our system also aggregates products and destinations for shipping optimization. We introduced the following new relevant input parameters in order to implement a double-side aggregation: (a) price-quantity curves provided by the seller; (b) waiting time, that is, the longer buyers wait, the greater discount they get; (c) payment time, which determines if the buyer pays before, during or after receiving the product; (d) the distance between the place where products are available and the place of shipment, provided in advance by the buyer or dynamically suggested by the system. To analyze the proposed model we implemented a system prototype and a simulator that allow to study effects of changing some input parameters. We analyzed the dynamic price model in fairs having one single seller and a combination of selected sellers. The results are very encouraging and motivate further investigation on this topic